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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROLLAND BURGESS and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH
Respondents,
vs.
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL, JWR
CONSTRUCTION and WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Petitioners.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 970404-CA
Priority Classification:
7

)

BRIEF OF WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and
JWR CONSTRUCTION

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to §§34A-l-30(2)(b); 34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii); 34A-1303(6); 34A-2-80K7) ; 34A-2-801 (8) (a) ; Utah Code Ann. 1997
and 63-46B-16, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL:
1.

Did the Industrial Commission misinterpret the

interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-988 (claim barred if
it is not filed within six years from the date of the
accidental injury), Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-659 (temporary
total disability compensation paid over a period of eight
years from the date of accidental injury) and Utah Code Ann.
§§35-1-78 (1) & (3)(a) & (b), 10 which grant the Commission
continuing jurisdiction but specifically provides that
11

[T] he commission has no power to change the statutes of

limitation..." of the Workers Compensation Act?
2.

In other words, when the Commission dismisses a

claim, either on its merits or without prejudice, does the
Workers Compensation Act of Utah require an applicant to

8

.

9

10

Currently Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-417, (1997).
Currently Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410, (1997).

.

Currently Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420, (1997).

2

file another Application for Hearing when the injured worker
has evidence of a change in circumstance justifying the
Commission's applying its continuing jurisdiction within the
six-year period established by the Legislature in Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-98 or the eight-year period of Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-65?
3.

When an injured worker files an application for

hearing, are the defendants entitled to have a hearing and
decision on the merits as the facts exist at the time of the
application?

In other words, is the filing of an

application for hearing an appropriate mechanism to prevent
limitation periods from running on unripe claims?
STANDAt
The standard of review is a correction of error
standard without deference to the decision of the
administrative agency when "the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law."

Utah Administrative

Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-26b-16(4)(d) & (h)(iv);

Questar

Pipeline

v

(Utah 1991); Morton
Division

Utah State
International,

~f the Utah State

1991); Mor-Flo

Tax Comm'nt 817 P.2d 316

Industries

Inc.,

Tax Comm'n,

v\

814 P.2d 581 (Utah

v. Board of Review,

(Utah App. 1991) .

3

Auditing

817 P.2d 328

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98/ (1990).
benefits.

Claims and

*•**

(2) A claim for compensation for
temporary total disability benefits,
temporary partial disability benefits,
permanent partial disability benefits,
or permanent total disability benefits
is barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed.•.within six years
after the date of the accident.
(Emphasis added)

(appendix 1)

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78, (1990).
Continuing jurisdiction of commission-No authority to change statutes of
limitation--Authority to destroy
records--Interest on award--Authority to
approve final settlement claims.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the
commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after
notice and hearing, may from time to
time modify or change its former
findings and orders...
****

(3) (a) This section may not be
interpreted as modifying in any respect
the statutes of limitations contained in
other sections of this chapter...
(b) The commission has no power to
change the statutes of limitation
referred to in Subsection (3)(a) in any
respect.
(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 2)

4

3.

Utah Code Aim. §35-1-65(1), (1981) Temporary
disability
...In no case shall [temporary total
disability] compensation exceed 312
weeks...over a period of eight years
from the date of the injury.

(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3)
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, (1990' k 19 1 1 )
Permanent partial disability,..
An employee who sustained a permanent
impairment as a result of an industrial
accident and who files an application
for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may
receive a permanent partial disability
award from the commission.

(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 5)
5.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, (1988 & 1994)
Permanent total disability
[Both are silent as to any limitation
period.]

(Appendix 6)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Nature of the Case
This is a workers compensation claim by respondent
Rolland Burgess (hereinafter "Burgess") for benefits
provided by the Workers Compensation Act of Utah.
to 109)

(§§35-1-1

On March 25, 1996, Burgess filed two Applications

for Hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah11
(hereinafter the "Commission").

11

.

The first was for a July 1,

Currently the Labor Commission of Utah.

5

1990, accident against his employer at the time, Siaperas
Sand and Gravel (hereinafter, "Siaperas").
Appendix 8)

(R. 1-2;

The second was for an August 18, 1994, accident

while he was employed with JWR Construction (Hereinafter,
"JWR").

(R. 10-11; Appendix 9 ) .

In each case the Workers

Compensation Fund of Utah (Hereinafter, "WCF") was the
insurer for workers compensation purposes.

In each he

claimed entitlement to additional medical benefits,
temporary total compensation, permanent partial
compensation, travel expenses and interest.

(R. 1 and 10)

WCF responded on April 23 and 24, 1996, on behalf of
itself and Burgess' employers.

Among other admissions and

denials, WCF admitted Burgess was involved in accidents
arising out of and in the course of employment on the dates
alleged, but denied that Burgess was entitled to any
additional compensation or medical benefits.

(R. 29-31 and

32-33)
The claims were thereafter set for a joint hearing.
(R. 35)
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings
1.

At the evidentiary hearing scheduled for August

28, 1996, the parties were present and represented by their
respective counsel. (R. 187-254)

Before commencing with the

evidence, Burgess filed two motions:

6

1) "Motion to Amend

Application for Hearing and Join the Employers Reinsurance
Fund" in which he moved to amend each application to include
a claim for permanent total disability compensation (Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-67.12) (R. 182-186; Appendix 10); and 2)
"Motion to Continue Without Date the Applicant's Claim for
Additional Benefits" (R. 185-186; Appendix 11). WCF opposed
the motions.
2.

After briefing by the parties, on November 22,

1996, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio entered her
Order on Motion to Amend.

(R. 291-296; Appendix 12)

Judge

Elicerio ordered:
...[T]he applicant/petitioner's Motion to Amend
Application for Hearing and Join the Employers
Reinsurance Fund is granted and the
applicant/petitioner's Motion to Continue Without
Date the Applicant's Claim for Additional Benefits
is denied.
[T]he amended claim is dismissed without
prejudice as there is no justiciable issue at this
time.
(R. 2 95; Appendix 12 at page 5)
3.

Each side filed motions for review of the

administrative law judge's order.
Burgess, 311-315).
motion.

(WCF, R, 2 97-310;

Each side filed a reply Lo l lit; other's

(WCF, R. 316-330; Burgess, R. 332-336)

claimed:

Currently Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413, (1997)

7

Burgess

A.
The administrative law judge erred when
she denied the petitioner's motion to
continue without date his claim for
additional benefits...[or] in the alternative
the... Commission may want to rule that the
timely filing of an application for
additional future benefits, even if it is
dismissed without prejudice, is sufficient to
toll the running of the statute of
limitations.
312 and 314)
B.
Petitioner's right to amend his
applications is not extinguished [by the
statute of limitations and]...should
relate back to the time of the filing of
the original applications.
331 and 333)
WCF argued:
A.
The applicant's right to amend his
application for hearing...against
Siaperas Sand and Gravel, is
extinguished because the six-year
statute of limitations had run on his
claim for permanent total disability [by
the time of the filing of the motion].
298)
B.
If the applicant is permitted to
amend his original application for
hearing, the amended claims should be
dismissed with prejudice. §35-1-78.
dismissal without prejudice is
inappropriate as it implies that
"... further proceedings are
required...before the agency's final
response to the claims will be made."

Doubletree,

Inc.

v. Industrial

Comm'n,

797 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah App. 1990).
further proceedings are necessary.
299-300)

8

A

No

C.
Continuing the petitioner's claims
for future benefits without date is not
within the ... Commission's continuing
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §35-178;
(R. 317)
D.
There is no provision for an indefinite
tolling of the statute of limitations contained in
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, nor can this statute be
interpreted as allowing such tolling.
(R. 319)
Disposition by the Labor Commission
The Labor Commission entered its "Order on Motions for
Review" on June 9, 1997, denying both parties' motions for
review and ruled:
1.

When the administrative law judge dismissed the

applications, the alleged error of allowing an amendment to
include an otherwise barred claim for permanent total
disability became moot; and
2.

"In light of the Industrial Commission's

continuing jurisdiction in this case, it j^ unnecessary to
hold Mr. Burgess' application for hearing open.

Instead,

Mr. Burgess may request that the Industrial Commission
reopen the matter if future developments wdiiant such a
request."

The Commission cited Stoker

Compensation

Fund,

The

Workers'

889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994)(Appendix

15) to support its ruling.
(R. 347-351)

v.

Statement of Facts
1.

Burgess, alleged he sustained two compensable

industrial injuries.

The first occurred on July 1, 1990,

while he was working for Siaperas Sand and Gravel.

The

second occurred on August 18, 1994, while he was working for
JWR, Inc.

He filed Applications for Hearing for each claim

on March 25, 1996.

In each Application Burgess claimed

entitlement to Medical Expenses, Recommended Medical Care,
Temporary Total Compensation, Permanent Partial
Compensation, Travel Expenses and Interest.

(R. 1-2, 10-

11; Appendices 8 & 9)
3.

WCF answered on behalf of Siaperas Sand and Gravel

and JWR Construction admitting that Burgess had suffered
accidents on the dates as alleged, but denying that Burgess
was entitled to any additional benefits.

(R. 29-31 and 32-

33)
4.
(R. 35)

An evidentiary hearing was set for August 28, 1996.
On the date of the hearing, Burgess filed two

motions:
A.

"Motion to Amend Application for Hearing and

Join the Employer's Reinsurance Fund" in which Burgess
asserts for the first time a claim for permanent total
disability benefits for each alleged accident (R. 182-184,
Appendix 10); and

10

H

"Motion to Continue Without Date the

Applicant's Claim for Additional Benefits" in which Burgess
cited the reason for the amended applications and this
motion is "...to preserve his claim for these additional
benefits..."

(R. 185-186, Appendix 11)

There was no claim

of a justiciable controversy or that Burgess was currentlyentitled to any additional benefits.
5.

WCF responded on September 25, 1996.

(R. 259-269)

Therein, WCF asserted:
A.

It is inappropriate to fi"]p an Application

for Hearing to preserve rights with an open ended extension
of time to take action.

The filing of the application

constitutes an affirmation that there are issues that need
to be determined on their merits as the facts then exist.
The defendants are as entitled to their "day in court" to
dispose of claims < »u their merits as i.o the -applicant;
B.

Burgess is not entitled to enlarge upon the

applicable limitation periods of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-98
and 35-1-35-1-65(1); and
C.

Burgess should not be allowed to amend his

application to include a claim for permanent total
disability compensation (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-6 7) it the
amendment's sole purpose is to preserve an unripe potential

11

future claim after the six-year limitation period of Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-98 has expired.
6.

On November 22, 1996, the Administrative Law Judge

entered her "Order on Motion to Amend".
Appendix 12)
A.

(R. 291-296,

Among other findings and rulings, she:
Commented the case authority and statutory

authority is unclear as to whether to allow the amendment or
not and she therefore would allow the proposed amendment (R.
294, Appendix 12 at p. 4 ) ;
B.

Declined to continue the matter without date

but dismissed the application "without prejudice" (R. 294,
Appendix 12 at p. 4 ) ;
C.

Declined to rule on what effect, if any, the

requested amendments will have on the right to claim future
benefits (R. 294, Appendix 12 at p. 4 ) ; and
D.

Declined to take a position on what

limitations apply to the accidents commenting that "...this
area of the law remains unsettled in the appellate courts".
(R. 294, Appendix 12 at p. 4)
7.

On December 20, 1996, Burgess filed a Motion for

Review (R. 311-315) in which he challenged the
Administrative Law Judge's failure to continue the
applications without date and instead dismissing them
without prejudice.

12

8.

On January 3, 1997, Workers Compensation Fund, on

behalf of its defendant insureds, responded to Burgess'
Motion for Review and argued (R. 297-310):
A.

There is no provision in the Workers

Compensation Act of Utah which allows an indefinite tolling
of the limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98.
B.

The commission's continuing jurisdiction

provided by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 does not allow it to
extend the limitation periods of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-98
and 35-1-65 (1) .
C.

Furthermore, Burgess' amendment should not be

allowed to revive a claim for permanent total disability
arising from his 1990 accident for which claim the six year
limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98 had expired
following his original application but before his Motion to
Amend was filed.
9.

The Industrial Commission entered its "Order on

Motions for Review" on June 9, 1997, (R. 341-345, Appendix
13) and ruled:
A.

When the administrative law judge dismissed

the applications, the alleged error of allowing an amendment
to include an otherwise barred claim for permanent total
disability became moot; and

13

B.

" I n l i g h t of t h e I n d u s t r i a l

continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s case,
h o l d Mr. B u r g e s s '

it

Commission's

is unnecessary

a p p l i c a t i o n for hearing open.

Mr. B u r g e s s may r e q u e s t t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l
reopen the matter if
request."
Compensation

Instead,

Commission

future developments warrant such a

The Commission c i t e d Stoker
Fund,

to

889 P . 2 d 4 0 9 , 412

15) a s s u p p o r t i v e of i t s

v.

The

Workers'

(Utah 19 9 4 ) ( A p p e n d i x

ruling.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

U t a h Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 8 ,

(1990)

(Appendix 1)

in

c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l code s e c t i o n s , p r o v i d e s

both

s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e e x t e n t
compensation the L e g i s l a t u r e has chosen t o provide
injured workers.13

S t a t u t e s such as the weekly

of
for

compensation

s t a t u t e s t h a t a r e t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s p e t i t i o n w h i c h
f i l i n g w i t h i n a s e t p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g an a c c i d e n t
s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n .
P.2d 670, 587-88

Avis

v . Industrial

13
Temporary T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y .
3) Temporary T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y shall
eight years after
date of the injury.
(1997).
(Appendix 3)

are

Commission,

(Utah App. 1 9 9 2 ) ( A p p e n d i x 1 7 ) .

require

See

117
also.

Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 , (1981) (Appendix
not exceed 312 weeks,..over
a period
of
C u r r e n t l y Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410,

Permanent P a r t i a l D i s a b i l i t y .
Utah Code Ann.
§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 6 ( 1 9 9 0 & 1991 i n t h i s
c a s e ) ( A p p e n d i x 5) An employee...who
files
an application
for hearing
under
Utah
Code Ann. Section
35-1-98 may receive
a permanent
partial
disability
award from
the commission.
C u r r e n t l y Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412, (1997) .
(Appendix 5)
Permanent T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y .
Utah Code Ann § 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 , (1988 and 1994 i n t h i s
c a s e ) ( A p p e n d i x 6) i s s i l e n t r e g a r d i n g a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . ( C u r r e n t l y Utah
Code Ann. § 3 4 A - 2 - 4 1 3 , ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
(Appendix 7)
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Stoker

v.

Industrial

Comm'n,

889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah

1994)(Appendix 15); Middlestadt

v. Industrial

Comm'n,

852

P.2d 1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1993)(Appendix 16).
Moreover, each weekly compensation entitlement section
of the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann.
§§35-1-1 to 109) (Hereinafter, the "Act") individually, or
in combination with Section 98, limits the outside date of
onset and the period during which the disability must occur
if it is to be compensated.

The duration of the

compensation benefit is likewise prescribed.
The limits placed on the disability compensation
benefits are a part of the careful balancing of respective
rights between employees and employers embodied in the Act.
It fulfills the basic purpose of the Act.

It provides a no-

fault solution to a particularly severe social evil of the
industrial age, ie. leaving industry's injured workers and
their dependent spouses and children impoverished and
subjects of public assistance.

It likewise provides the

employer with a system of well-defined, predictable, and
limited no-fault liability for employees injured on the job.
(See Appendix 18 "Workers' Compensation Act, A Careful
Balancing of Constitutional Rights".)
The limitation periods within which to file an
Application for Hearing for the various types of

15

disabilities provided for by the Act are not in conflict
with the Commission's continuing jurisdiction provided by
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78.

The Legislature cured any such

conflict by giving priority to the limitations:
(3)
(a) This section may not be
interpreted as modifying in any
respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this
chapter...
(b) The commission has no power to
change the statutes of limitations
referred to in Subsection (a) in
any respect.
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(3)(a) & (b), (1990)(Appendix 2)
(Emphasis Added)
The Commission's order in this matter has the effect of
giving Burgess and other similarly situated claimants openended relief from the legislature's mandated limitations.
That is contrary to the plain language of the statutes
involved.

It is contrary to the basic intent and purpose of

the act to provide certain balanced rights between injured
workers and their employers.
One of the rights that inures to the benefit of each
party is the right to a hearing on the merits once an
employee files an Application for Hearing.

With a filing,

the employer and its insurance carrier are entitled to put
the applicant to his or her burden to prove the claim(s)
made in the application by the weight of the evidence as it
16

then exists.

Once an accident arising out of and in the

course of the employment is established, if the applicant
cannot support claims for weekly compensation benefits, such
claims should be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
The Commission then loses jurisdiction over the already
adjudicated matters.

In appropriate cases, the Commission's

jurisdiction can thereafter be invoked pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-78, but only by a timely application for hearing
supported by a prima

facie

showing of a material change in

the applicant's condition which occurred subsequent to the
earlier order.

The application must be filed within the

time limitations of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98 or the specific
applicable code section.
To do otherwise as argued by Burgess below is contrary
to the clear statutory language and legislative intent.

17

ARGUMENT
THE LIMITATION PERIODS ESTABLISHED BY THE
LEGISLATURE FOR WEEKLY COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-98 OR INDIVIDUAL STATUTES
ARE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND JUSTIFIABLE
LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTENT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS
AVAILABLE TO INJURED WORKMEN. THEY ARE
LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMISSION'S CONTINUING
JURISDICTION ESTABLISHED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-178.
A.
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN UTAH CODE ANN. §§35-178 AND 35-1-98 IN CONJUNCTION WITH UTAH CODE ANN.
§§35-1-65, -66, AND -67 SHOWS A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE
INTENT. EVEN SHOULD THE COURT FIND THE STATUTES
AMBIGUOUS OR CONFLICTING, THE SPECIFIC LIMITATION
LANGUAGE OF §35-1-98 AND/OR THE INDIVIDUAL
SECTIONS, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ARE CONTROLLING.
THAT LEADS TO BUT ONE CONCLUSION: ANY DISABILITY
WHICH COMMENCES AFTER THE SPECIFIC APPLICABLE
LIMITATION PERIOD IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
AN
APPLICATION FOR HEARING FILED BEFORE THE
DISABILITY OCCURS DOES NOT TOLL THE LIMITATION
PERIOD.

In O'Keefe

v.

Utah State

Retirement

Bd.,

929 P.2d 1112

(Utah App. 1996), this Court succinctly set forth the rules
of statutory construction applicable to this case:
We begin by examining the statute's plain language
and resort to other methods of statutory
interpretation only if the language of the statute
is ambiguous. In examining the plain language of
the statute, we attempt to give meaning to each
part of the statute so as to give effect to all of
the statutory terms. If doubt remains, "the court
should analyze the act in its entirety and
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the
legislative intent and purpose. Within these
confines, we attempt "to give effect to the intent
of the legislature in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve."
18

O'Keefe,

929 P.2d at 1114 (Citations omitted.)

The Supreme Court established clear precedent in
resolving the issue of whether Section 78 or a specific
statute of limitations should prevail in the context of
workers' compensation law.

States

Smelting,

Refining

430 P.2d 162 (Utah 1967).

United

The dispositive case is

and Mining Company vs.
(Appendix 14)

miner injured in a 1952 cave-in.

Nielsen,

Nielsen was a

After having received

compensation periodically and a lump sum settlement, Nielsen
had complications which required further surgery.

He

suffered additional permanent partial impairment as a
result.

In 1965 he filed a claim for additional

compensation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 (1951) .
The Supreme Court held Nielsen's claim to be time-barred.
The Court also held Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 does not
override the time restrictions of limitation periods of
specific statutes:
Defendant in this case says that Sec.
[35-1-78,
Utah Code Annotated 1953] overrides the six -year
limitation statutes when it says that:
"the powers and jurisdiction of the commission
over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change
with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be
justified."
We have no quarrel with the above statute, but
construe it to mean the commission has continuing
jurisdiction only during the period of the
limitation statutes mentioned above, and has
19

nothing to do with the abrogation of or exception
to such limitations statutes...
430 P.2d at 164.(Appendix 14 at page 3 ) 1 4

(Emphasis added.)

Similarly, in the instant case, the Commission
erroneously, or because of the confusion expressed by the
administrative law judge, contends Section 78 allows it
indefinite, continuing jurisdiction to modify its orders
and, apparently to make awards for disabilities occurring
after the specific limitation periods of the statutes.
The limitations placed on Burgess' claims by the
Legislature as of the time of his accidents are:
1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, (1990).
benefits.

Claims and

****

(2) A claim for compensation for
temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s ,
temporary p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s ,
permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s ,
or permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s
i s barred, unless an application for
hearing i s f i l e d . • . w i t h i n s i x years
a f t e r the date of the a c c i d e n t .
(Emphasis added)
2.

(Appendix 1)

Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 ( 1 ) ,
Temporary d i s a b i l i t y

14

(1981)

.
See a l s o Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217,
217-218 (Utah 1973) c i t i n g approvingly the holding in Nielsen regarding the
l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d for weekly "compensation" b e n e f i t s while holding t h a t medical
b e n e f i t s are not "compensation" t o which the l i m i t a t i o n a p p l i e s .
20

...In no case shall [temporary total
disability] compensation exceed 312
weeks...over a period of eight years
from the date of the injury.
(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3]
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, (1990 & 1991)
Permanent partial disability...
An employee who sustained a permanent
impairment as a result of an industrial
accident and who files an application
for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may
receive a permanent partial disability
award from the commission.
(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 5)
4.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, (1988 & 1994)
Permanent total disability
[Both the 1988 and 1994 version are
silent as to any limitation period,
therefore §98 applies.]

(Appendix 6)
The Commission fails to recognize that it has no power
to "...change..." or to

"modify in any respect the statutes

of limitations contained in other sections of [the Act]...
in any respect.."

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (Appendix 2)

There are differences in the applicable limitation
periods.15

However, the basic rule of statutory

15

.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 above dealing with Temporary Total
Disability. Also, though not claimed by Burgess herein and therefore not at
issue, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65.1, (1990) Temporary Partial Disability provides a
specific limitation period

(2) The commission may make an award for temporary
partial
disability
for work at any time prior to eight years after the

21

date

construction found in Nielsen

provides that a specific

limitation period takes precedent over the general
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission as well as any
general limitation period.
Applying the holding of Nielsen,

the Commission should

have dismissed Burgess' Applications on the merits based on
his failure to make a prima

facie

showing of a current

entitlement to any weekly compensation benefits.

That would

result in Burgess' claims for permanent total disability
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67) and for permanent partial
disability (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66) for the 1990 accident
being totally barred because he cannot show either a
permanent total disability commencing within the six-year
period or an additional permanent partial impairment
occurring within the six-year period from the date of his
accident as required by Section 98.
As to Burgess' other claims for weekly compensation not
already barred, he would have the burden to present

of the injury
finally

to an

employee:

(a) whose physical
condition
resulting
from the injury
healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury;
(b)

who files

prima

an application

for hearing

under Section

is not
and
35-1-

98.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor
continue more than eight years after the date of the injury. . .
(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 4)
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facie

evidence of a material change in his condition and

that one of the disabilities for which compensation is
provided has occurred within the specified period by a
likewise timely filing of an Application for Hearing.

Only

in that manner could the continuing jurisdiction of the
Commission be invoked.
For the July 1, 1990, accident the only remaining claim
for weekly compensation is for temporary total disability
compensation.

Provided he can sustain his burden of proof,

Burgess is entitled to up to ...312
eight

years

from

1-65(1), (1981)

the

date

of

(Appendix 3)

the

weeks...over
injury.

a period

of

Utah Code Ann. §35-

Applying a liberal

interpretation favoring coverage16, he can invoke the
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission up to June 30,
1998, by filing an application for hearing.
Applying the same principles to the August 18, 1994,
accident:
1.

§35-1-67

Burgess does not have current proof of

an entitlement to permanent total disability.

To

perfect a claim, he must refile before the
expiration of six years from the date of the
accident to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of

From the inception of the Act, the appellate courts of Utah have held
that it is to be liberally construed to afford coverage for injured workmen.
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Was Laundry,
156 P.2d 885, 885-886 (Utah 1945)

23

He must present prima

the Commission.

facie

evidence of such disability occurring within six
years from the date of his accident or not later
than August 17, 2 000;
2.

§35-1-66

Burgess does not have current proof of

an entitlement to permanent partial disability
compensation.

To perfect a claim, he must refile

before the expiration of six years from the date
of the accident to invoke the continuing
jurisdiction of the Commission.
prima

facie

He must present

evidence of such disability occurring

within six years from the date of his accident or
not later than August 17, 2 0 00; and
3.

§35-1-65

Burgess does not have current proof of

an entitlement to temporary total disability
compensation.

To perfect a claim, he must refile

before the expiration of eight years from the date
of the accident to invoke the continuing
jurisdiction of the Commission.
prima

facie

He must present

evidence of such disability occurring

within eight years from the date of his accident
or not later than August 17, 2002.
The Nielsen

principle of construction has not changed

since 1967--the [C]ommission

has continuing

24

jurisdiction

only

during

the period

of

the

limitation

statutes.

430 P.2nd

at 164.

B.
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES LEAVES NO
DOUBT THAT THE SIX-YEAR AND EIGHT-YEAR LIMITS ARE
ALSO LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMISSION'S CONTINUING
JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS.

The l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d s of t h e c o d e s e c t i o n s a t
a r e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n .
Compensation

Fund,

See Stoker

889 P . 2 d 4 0 9 , 412

v.

v.

Industrial

Workers

(Utah 1994)

( i n t e r p r e t i n g U t a h Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 ( 1 )
Middlestadt

issue

Commission,

(Appendix 1 5 ) ;

852 P . 2 d 1 0 1 2 ,

(Utah App. 1993) , i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s i m i l a r s t a t u t e
l i m i t a t i o n found i n U t a h Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 9 ,
(Repealed)17
Commission,

(Appendix 1 6 ) ; and Avis
837 P . 2 d 584, 5 8 4 - 5 8 8

v.

w i t h U t a h Code Ann. §§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 ,

(Utah App.

Commission o b t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o m m i s s i o n
commission,

1992)
(Appendix 1 7 ) .
conjunction

-67 and - 9 8 .

After

the

" . . . T h e p o w e r s and
. . . s h a l l be c o n t i n u i n g .

a f t e r n o t i c e and h e a r i n g ,

modify o r change i t s

(1953)

must be r e a d i n
-66,

of

Industrial

( i n t e r p r e t i n g U t a h Code Ann. § § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 & 66)
U t a h Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 7 8 ( 1 )

1013-14

may from t i m e t o

f o r m e r f i n d i n g s and o r d e r s . . . "

The
time

Utah

The s u b s t a n t i v e p r o v i s i o n s of Utah Code Ann. Section 3 5-1-98 were
f i r s t passed in 1988 as Utah Code Section 35-1-99 which s e c t i o n was repealed in
1990 with i t s s u b s t a n t i v e p a r t s reenacted as Section 98.
25

Code Ann. §35-1-78(1)

The Section 78 language has remained

essentially unchanged since 1917.
Utah appellate courts have had many opportunities to
explore the limits of the continuing jurisdiction.

The

basis for a modification of a prior order is dependent upon
a showing of a material change in the claimant's condition
not previously adjudicated, based upon a new application for
hearing making such claims.

After a final decision on the

merits, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to reopen,
reconsider or change its original decision denying an award
of compensation, in the absence of evidence of a change or
new development.
Comm'n,

Kennecott

Copper

Corp.

v.

Industrial

19 Utah 2d 158-60, 427 P.2d 952, 952-954 (1967) .

This Court discussed the Kennecott
in Retherford

vs.

Industrial

decision favorably

Comm'n and AT&T, 73 9 P.2d 76

(Utah App. 1987):
...In [the Kennecott]
case, the Industrial
Commission entered an order... denying a claim for
benefits. The claimant filed an application for a
rehearing.. .which was denied... [T]he commission
rescinded its order...denying compensation and
ordered a rehearing. The rehearing was held
and...the commission entered an order granting
benefits...Kennecott petitioned for judicial
review contending that the commission did not have
authority to make the award...The Utah Supreme
Court...held that the commission did not have
jurisdiction to make the award of benefits having
once determined the matter on the merits.
739 P.2d at 78-79 (Footnote 5 of the opinion omitted.)
(Emphasis added.)
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In 1988, the Legislature passed two significant
amendments to the Workers Compensation Act.

First, it added

the six year limitation language for the first time applying
a limitation period to permanent total disability
compensation.18

Prior to 1988, unlike permanent partial

disability19 and temporary total disability20,21 there was no
specific limitation period imposed on claims for permanent
total disability compensation.22
Second, as part of the same package of legislation, the
Legislature put additional limits on the Commission's
continuing jurisdiction:
(3)

(a) This section may not be
interpreted as modifying in any
respect the s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s
contained in other sections of t h i s
chapter...
(b) The commission has no power to
change the s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s
18

.
See Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 9 ( 3 ) , ( 1 9 8 8 ) , which was l a t e r r e c o d i f i e d a s
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 8 ( 2 ) , (1990) and c u r r e n t l y i s found unchanged a s Utah Code
Ann. §34A-2-417, ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
19

.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 6 , (1983), "The commission may make a p e r m a n e n t
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y award a t any t i m e p r i o r t o e i g h t y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a t e of
i n j u r y t o an e m p l o y e e . . . w h o f i l e s an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s u c h p u r p o s e p r i o r t o t h e
e x p i r a t i o n of s u c h e i g h t - y e a r p e r i o d . "
20

. Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 , "In no c a s e s h a l l s u c h c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s
e x c e e d 312 weeks a t t h e r a t e of 100% of t h e s t a t e a v e r a g e weekly wage a t t h e t i m e
of t h e i n j u r y o v e r a p e r i o d of e i g h t y e a r s from t h e d a t e of t h e i n j u r y . "
21

.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 . 1 p r o v i d i n g f o r t e m p o r a r y p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y
was f i r s t p a s s e d i n 1990. Before t h a t , t h e r e was no p r o v i s i o n f o r s u c h b e n e f i t s .

22

Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 ,

(1985)
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referred to in Subsection (a) in
any respect.
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (3) (a) & (b) , (1988)

(Emphasis

Added)
Two things are clear from the current statutory format
and appellate court decisions:

1) If one fails to file an

Application for Hearing to have his or her claim adjudicated
on the merits within the applicable period of time from the
date of the accident, the claim is barred.
never gained jurisdiction.

2)

The Commission

The Commission has no

jurisdiction to relitigate those issues determined after a
hearing on the merits by final order.

However, if there is

a material change in circumstance occurring at a later date,
the Commission's continuing jurisdiction applies up to the
outside time limits placed on it by specific statutes.
In contrast, the effect of a continuance without a date
of hearing as requested by the applicant, or a dismissal
without prejudice, as the Commission did herein, present
different scenarios not within the four squares of the Act
as passed by the Legislature.

First, a continuance without

date leaves the parties hanging with no way to conclude the
issues claimed in the Application.

That is contrary to the

Commission's own rule regarding applications for hearing:
The Application for Hearing is the request for
agency action...

28

Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.A, -4.B. (Emphasis added)

An

Application for Hearing is not a request for inaction.

This

rule is in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act
and provides a mechanism for the Industrial Commission to
determine the disputed legal interests of an applicant and
his or her employer regarding benefit entitlements.
Utah Code Ann.

§63-46b-l, -3 (1993 Supp. 1996.)

See

The effect

of a continuance without date is to allow Burgess to add
claims for future benefits which both he and the Commission
concede are "potential" and "speculative" future claims with
no supporting evidence.

That subverts the hearing process

which is to provide a forum for workers compensation dispute
resolution.
Next, a dismissal without prejudice is notification to
the parties that "'further proceedings are required,' i.e.,
refiling of the claims and more diligent prosecution of
them, before the agency's final response to the claims will
be made."

Doubletree,

Inc.

464, 466 (Utah App. 1990)

v. Industrial

Comm'n,

797 P.2d

Cases that are dismissed without

prejudice before the Labor Commission involve claims that
present no justiciable issues or which have various
procedural flaws.

Bacon

v.

Industrial

549 (Utah App. 1993)
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Comm'n,

854 P.2d 548,

In the instant case, Burgess applied for and received a
hearing date.

He invoked agency action.

WCF, Siaperas and

JWR appeared ready, willing and able to defend the claims.
He, in essence, told the Commission, "I have no evidence to
support claims to additional weekly compensation.
have some at some indefinite time in the future.

I might
Though I

do not know when it will be, please, take no action until I
ask."

There are no further proceedings required.

nothing pending before the Commission.
closed.

There is

His claim should be

The claim can only be reopened by the filing of a

new Application for Hearing asserting a change in
circumstance subsequent to the date of the order
adjudicating the issues he chose at this time to present to
the Commission.

hearing...with
date

of

the

If he fails to file an application

the commission within
accident

six years

after

for

the

for permanent partial disability and/or

permanent total disability and/or within eight years after
the date of the accident for temporary total disability, his
claims will be barred.
CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65, -66, -67, -78 and 35-1-98
are parts of a careful balancing of the rights of employers
and employees provided by the Workers' Compensation Act of
Utah. (See Appendix 7, Workers' Compensation Act a Careful

30

Balancing of Constitutional Rights.)

One those rights is

the employers' right to have claims made by Applications for
Hearing adjudicated on their merits as they exist at the
time of the application.

It is inappropriate to dismiss an

application without prejudice when the purpose of the filing
is not to adjudicate claims for presently accrued rights.
If the applicant cannot prevail on his or her claims by a
preponderance of the evidence, the claims should be
dismissed with prejudice.
The six-year limitation of section 98 establishes a
time period during which an injured worker must file an
application for hearing and within which permanent partial
disability must occur or permanent total disability must
commence for either to be compensable.

Temporary total

disability is compensable if an application for hearing is
filed prior to the expiration of eight years.

worker is entitled to up to 312 weeks...over
eight

years

from

the date

of the injury.

The injured

a period

of

Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-65, (1981)(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3)

Those periods

are both statutes of limitation and reasonable limits to the
compensation benefit allowed under the Workers' Compensation
Act of Utah.

There is no inconsistency between Section 98

and Section 78.

As the Court held in Nielsen,
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the

commission has continuing
period

of the limitation

jurisdiction
statutes.

only during

the

430 P.2nd at 164.

Again, when an applicant invokes the Commission's
jurisdiction by an Application for Hearing, each party is
entitled to have the issues determined on the merits as
supported by the facts then existing.

Following such a

determination by the Commission, the issues presented by the
Application are final adjudications.

The Commission then

loses jurisdiction as to those issues.

Jurisdiction can

again be invoked pursuant to Section 78 by a timely filing
of another Application for Hearing.

That application must

be based upon material changes in circumstance subsequent to
the prior order.

Further, the application and the

circumstance leading to a further claim for disability
compensation must occur prior to the expiration of the
applicable limitation period.

Then and only then the

Commission will have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.
Otherwise, it is without jurisdiction.
The Commission's Order herein should be amended to
dismiss the Application with prejudice and to reflect the
limits placed on Burgess' potential future claims provided
by the Workers Compensation Act of Utah as argued herein.
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DATED this

}

day of December, 1997.
JAMES R. BLACK & ASSOCIATES

fee*
s R.nBiack
torneys for Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

I

day of December,

1997, I mailed four true and correct copies of the above
Brief of Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, postage prepaid,
to:
Hans M. Scheffler
311 South State Street
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Rolland Burgess
Alan L. Hennebold
Labor Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX 1

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-98, (1990) Claims and
Benefits

[Effective May 9, 1967-April 22, 1990.]
*1990 Repeal and Reenactment*
Section 35-1-98 was repealed in 1990 and reenacted to read as follows:
35-1-98. Claims and benefits.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years.
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is barred,
unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of
the accident.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of
the date of death of the employee.
[Effective April 23, 1990-present.]
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APPENDIX 2

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-78, (1990) Continuing
Jurisdiction of Commission

35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified.
[Effective 1917-May 8, 1961.]
*1961 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability, which have been closed and inactive for a period of 10
years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
[Effective May 9, 1961-June30, 1963.]
*1963 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
[Effective July 1, 1963-June 30, 1965.]
*1965 Amendment*
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify — Authority to destroy records.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
[Effective July 1, 1965-May 11, 1981.]
*1981 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award - Authority to destroy
194

records — Interest on award.
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases,
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
commission.
Awards made by the industrial commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988]
*1988 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Compensation Act.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in
Subsection (a) in any respect.
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.]
*1990 Amendment*
35-1-78, Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in
Subsection (a) in any respect.
[Effective April 23, 1990-May 1, 1994]
*1994 Amendment*
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35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(3)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in
Subsection (3)(a) in any respect.
[Effective May 2, 1994-April 30, 1995.]
*1995 Amendment*
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation —
Authority to approve final settlement claims.
(!) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former
findings and orders.
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases
of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3) Awards made by the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the
date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(4)
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in
Subsection (4)(a) in any respect.
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 35-1-90, the commission shall review and may
approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under
Chapters 1 and 2;
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit
entitlements under Chapters 1 and 2 by means of a lump sum payment, structured
settlement, or other appropriate payout.
[Effective May 1, 1995-present.]
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APPENDIX 3

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-65, (1981) Temporary
Disability

*1981 Amendment*
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage deflned.
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case shall such
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage
at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a
fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is available to the employee
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be
determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of each year, the total wages
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting
therefrom.
[Effective May 12, 1981-present.]

APPENDIX 4

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-65.1 '1990) Temporary
Partial Disability

J5-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
Where the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during
such disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight years from the date
of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the difference between that employee's average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, but not
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury per week and
in addition thereto $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 100% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of injury per week.
The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such
injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period.
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends or the death of the injured
employee.
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988.]
*1988 Amendment*
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly
compensation equal to:
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of injury.
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight
years after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or the
injured employee dies.
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.]
*1990 Amendment*
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly
compensation equal to:
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of injury.
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
*
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight
years after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or the
injured employee dies. (affg£7/>>/Z 4PX/£ J<? /4*a - /&>7)
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APPENDIX 5

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-66, (1990 & 1991)
Permanent Partial
Disability

(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member Partial
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the
member This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4)
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies
of 500, 1000, 2000 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authonties in the field of measurement
of hearing impairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall
not be considered in determining compensable disability If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000,
2000, and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and
3000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average
decibel loss To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by V/2% up to the maximum of 100%
which is reached at 92 decibels
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six The
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss Compensation for permanent partial
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter Where an employee
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission In no event shall compensation benefits
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided
for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded
by the commission based on the medical evidence Compensation for any such impairment shall, as
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function Permanent partial
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990 ]
*1990 Amendment*
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and
whofilesan application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may receive a permanent partial disability
award from the commission
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the
injured person
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In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state
-zz weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week
r
~- " ^~~Mdent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
pendent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to exceed four weeks for the
;ber of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation
provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability:
For the loss of
Number of Weeks
(A) Upper extremity
(aj
(b)
(c)

An*
Ar
A:
ow joint, at elbow
oi below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon

i)

218
18 7
178
i f>H

- .1

i a; At wns? vsT midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation
(b) All lingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joim>
».T) Thumb.
(a) At metacarpophalangeal jo;r_. .
, ,aipometacai pal bone
M
'
At interphalangeal joint
v finger
i) A t metacarpophalangeal j oint or with resection of metacarpal bone
(b) At proxirr '.'. interphalangeal joint
A: distal interphalangeal joint.
—ale linger
. a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone,
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
1
c) At distal interphalangeal joint
"~^ finger
At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
:) At distal interphalangeal joint
(*
Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
(c) At distal interphalangeal j oint
,
(B) Lower extremity
{„;
(b)
(c)

_ _emipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium
ibove knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less
u
-°—\ ;"t.ercondylar notch)

1 K
101

50
*2
*4
18

i
6
1

56
25

112

(2)

(3)

(d)
Foot
(a)
(b)
(c)
Toes
(a)

Leg below knee with functional stump

88

Foot at ankle
Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
Foot midmetatarsal amputation

88
66
44

Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
100
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4).
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows:
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies
of 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement
of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability infrequenciesabove 3000 cycles per second shall
not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1,000,
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists.
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1,000, 2,000, and
3,000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average
decibel loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by lVi% up to the maximum of 100%
which is reached at 92 decibels.
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall compensation benefits
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits.
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided
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for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded
by the commission based on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section.
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are a,
:w rations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and h* .,^ v. >. *hu» .;*ore than a maximum of 66%% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be [
[Effective April _
•- ;
*1991 Amendment*
35-1-66, Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an indus1
id
whofilesan application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may receive a permanent
tv
award from the commission.
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the
injured person.
In the case of the following inji ; i : s the compensation she
-j s
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than r
. „^ -.ate
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less
per week
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up io <i
maximum of four dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% o"
at
the time of the injury p-%f
'
pay period,
number of" n~u~ T,t iruiv^111
LiiciuuipcuM.^^
provided i
ai uot
- ^ ^~,v.«, ,....« y
For the loss of
Number ofWeeks
(A | Upper extremity
Arm
(a) " UK ,:,. *uluer (forequarter amputation)
218
(b,
it :>;.colder joint, or above deltoid insertion
187
(c) .Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint,
•alow elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon
178
\^\ • ^ ^ ^^1^^ *>m0w joint distal r <
- ^f-tton of biceps tendon
168
(2) Hand
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpa. .imp nation.
168
1
(b)
:gers except thumb at metacarpi
eal joint:.
H
(3) Thu..
{a ^ *• •
^nhalanizeal icint or with resection of carpometacarpal bone
67
(b,

(4)

_ tu.^,^j

-

Index finger
(a
etacarpophalangeal joint or with resection or met., J.
CI" 1 interphalangeal joint
^phalangeal joint

50

. ...42
...34
18

(5)

Middle finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
34
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
27
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
15
(6) Ring finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
17
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
13
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
8
(7) Little finger
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone
8
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
6
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
4
(B) Lower extremity
(1) Leg
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis)
156
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium
125
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less
below intercondylar notch)
112
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump
88
(2) Foot
(a) Foot at ankle
88
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's)
66
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation
44
(3) Toes
(a) Great toe
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
26
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
16
(iii) At interphalangeal joint
12
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th)
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
4
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint
3
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint
2
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint
1
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints
26
(4) Miscellaneous
(a) One eye by enucleation
120
(b) Total blindness of one eye
100
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing
109
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4).
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided
for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded
by the commission based on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as
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closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section.
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an
industrial accident.
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be
required to be paid.
[Effective April 29, 1991-present.]
35-2-58. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss due to noise to be compensated.
Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise shall be compensated
according to the terms and conditions of this act.
[Effective July 1, 1969-April 28, 1991.]
*1991 Amendment (section renumbered)*
35-1-66.1. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss due to noise to be compensated.
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise or by direct head injury
shall be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this chapter.
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful industrial noise shall be paid under this
chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that the
employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise as defined in Section 35-1-66.2 while
employed by the employer against whom the claim is made.
[Effective April 29, 1991-present.]
35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined.
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the sound emanatingfromequipment and machines during
employment exceeding the following permissible sound levels, dBA slow response, and
corresponding durations per day, in hours:
Sound Level

Durati*

90
92
95
97
100
102
105
110
115
(2)

(3)

8
6
4
3
2
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.25 or

Harmful industrial noise is also defined as sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudden
instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound
pressure levels.
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division of the commission may conduct tests to
determine the intensity of noise at places of employment. The administrative law judge may
consider such tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in the field of sound engineering,
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APPENDIX 6

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-67, (1988 & 1994)
Permanent Total Disability

*1988 Repeal and Reenactment*
Section 35-1-67 was repealed in 1988 and reenacted to read as follows:
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 6-%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
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(a)

Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b)
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind,
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50%
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) Afindingby the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the
vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation
training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), for use in the rehabilitation and
training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education certifies to the
commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that agency in its
efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not
able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The
parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order that the employee be
paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined
by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the death of the
employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In any
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case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible,
but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total
disability is required in any such instance.
[Effective July 1, 1988-July 14, 1988.]
*Subsequent 1988 Amendment*
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b)
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind,
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers'
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Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50%
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) Afindingby the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education for
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed
$3,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education
certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties,
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady
work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under
this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total
disability is required in any such instance.
[Effective July 15, 1988-April 28, 1991.]

*1994 Amendment*
-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(a)

In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as revised.
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R.
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee
at the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection
(2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest
dollar.
For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of
injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65,
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its
insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312
weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability
compensation.
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(e)

Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69.
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65,
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or
after the initial 312 weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has
received compensation form the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any
combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total
disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the
same period.
(6)
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant
to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return
the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier
provides the commission notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan; and
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any
reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under
Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Prior to the finding becomingfinal,the commission shall order the initiation of permanent
total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence. The
commission shall order the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due
the employee. The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability
payments against its ultimate disability compensation liability under Chapter 1 or 2.
(c) The commission may not order an employer or its insurance carrier to submit a
reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan:
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation
benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment
funded by the employer or its insurance carrier,
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for
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(7)

(8)
(9)

the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process,
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan.
The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment
plan shall be cause for the commission on its own motion to order a final finding of
permanent total disability,
(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the
commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability
compensation benefits.
The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the
death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
As determined by the commission, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this title.

(10)

(a)

The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet,
both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
[Effective July 1, 1994-April 30, 1995.]

Tab 7

APPENDIX 7

Utah Code Ann. Section 351-67, (1988 & 1994)
Permanent Total Disability

*1988 Repeal and Reenactment*
Section 35-1-67 was repealed in 1988 and reenacted to read as follows:
35-1-67, Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 6-%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
128

(a)

Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b)
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind,
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50%
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) Afindingby the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the
vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation
training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), for use in the rehabilitation and
training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education certifies to the
commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that agency in its
efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not
able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The
parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order that the employee be
paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined
by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the death of the
employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In any
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case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible,
but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the
employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total
disability is required in any such instance.
[Effective July 1, 1988-July 14, 1988.]
^Subsequent 1988 Amendment"1
35-1-67. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b)
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind,
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers'
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Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50%
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(5) Afindingby the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred:
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education for
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed
$3,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee.
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education
certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties,
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady
work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under
this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total
disability is required in any such instance.
[Effective July 15, 1988-April 28, 1991.]

*1994 Amendment*
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1)
(a) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall
receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of
Federal Regulations as revised.
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R.
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury,
limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum
established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee
at the time of the injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection
(2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest
dollar.
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of
injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65,
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its
insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312
weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability
compensation.
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(e)

Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69.
For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994:
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65,
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in excess of the amount of
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or
after the initial 312 weeks.
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has
received compensation form the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any
combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total
disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the
same period.
(a)

(b)

(c)

A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise
agreed to by the parties, until:
(i) the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant
to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return
the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier
provides the commission notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not
submit a plan; and
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any
reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under
Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
Prior to thefindingbecomingfinal,the commission shall order the initiation of permanent
total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence. The
commission shall order the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due
the employee. The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability
payments against its ultimate disability compensation liability under Chapter 1 or 2.
The commission may not order an employer or its insurance carrier to submit a
reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan:
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation
benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment
funded by the employer or its insurance carrier,
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for
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(7)

(8)
(9)

the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process,
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan.
The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment
plan shall be cause for the commission on its own motion to order afinalfindingof
permanent total disability,
(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the
commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability
compensation benefits.
The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the
death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
As determined by the commission, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this title.
(a)

The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet,
both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section.
(b) Afindingof permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final
[Effective July 1, 1994-April 30, 1995]
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Application for Hearing
dated March 25, 1995, for
July 1, 1990, Accident
While Working for Siaperas
Sand and Gravel

^b

Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication, Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Botf l£6£lf «'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615'% '<• < "
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK
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City, State and Zip Code
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APPLICATION FOR HEARING

Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee
v.
.

Employer's Street Address

a

O^aawf * « *o»* * 1 he provided ^ » B ^ O L

L

Sfapsras

D

F - * F V w n * Report

*

1

«fite:

[NOTE: Include all supporting documentation
U
when this form is filed with the Industrial Commission.] O
/

Employer's Insuraiice Carrier

(/

EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35:
I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer on ^c//( I /??& ^
1.
at the following location:
C<? /-/*» k/Qoc/
&&/ / ^ / / ? f
. *_
2.

The accident occurred as follows:

0&0//<r0»f

3.

The injuries I sustained are:

Dcof

The injury caused time off work from

Jpf/f

0JfJfr*//i*?*/i'6

P Z FsS/*

4

to

#Jfyf?//Cft*<f fob fa** rfjf <ir<W# £r tssrfat/f

; and

/t'toQ

I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse]

5.

A.
B.
C.
D.

/ Medical Expenses
j<^ Recommended Medical Care
Higher Weekly Rate
^ Temporary Total Compensation

E.
Temporary Partial Compensation I. yt- Interest
F. V Permanent Partial Compensation J.
Other (Specify)_
G.
Permanent Total Compensation
H. ^ Travel Expenses

My date of birth is
ct ~ D6 -r$~
. At the time of injury my wage was $ /S*~» <f<? per h 0u*^ ; and I was
working L/ct
__ hours per week. Also, I w a s J H H i married and had
A
dependent children under age
18 when I was injured.

6.

[If you need additional space to provide the information requested
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.]

**//**/0. 6c*ry«r

> ?r~/y7r

Printed
Employee
Tmtea Nime
Name of
or ninpioyee/^.
Signature
Employee
lipnatiire of Emnloveft
Signlture ofA£or&y

fir- 'W

forTsmploy

City/State/Zip Code

T1////

C^

0"/*** (//*/
i

T9*rr/

City/State/Zip Code of Employee

Street nuwtvoo «f A^rnev for Employee

yf

"?

Street Address of Employee

3S0
Sec

^s

t<M^n>/'SM
Telephone

Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number

UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION
0 0 0 0 0

00001

DOCUMENT$ WCTCH MUST ACCOMPANY THIS FORM
A. List all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) treated, date of
treatment and nature of treatment.
« '? ' '
B. Signed and notarized medical nuthonzation" - five more than total number of health care providers identified on the above list. .
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s).
D. In permanent total disability claims only, copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or
Appeals Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (form SS A 831-U5), if Social Security total disability has been
awarded.
E. If represented bv an attorney, completed and signed Appointment of Counsel Form.

PERMANENT. TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY
A.
B.
C.
D.

Date disability began:
Age when disability began:
Last grade completed in school:
Diplomas/degrees/special education classes:

Present age:

E. English language difficulties:
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties:
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding employee's ability to return to work:

H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application date date ; Current status of pending claim I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts:

J. Names of Employers, years worked and description of work performed:

00002

; Award

Tab 9

APPENDIX 9

Application for Hearing
Dated March 25, 1996, for
August 18, 1994, Accident
While Working for JWR
Construction Co.

Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
*
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK-* «*
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Employer's'Street Address
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City, State ancTZip Code
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[NOTE: Include all supporting documentation
when this form is filed with the Industrial Commission.]

Employer's Insurance Carrier
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35:
I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer on rftSKCf/' S*f
1.
/W6/
at the following location:
Q/vr Crstfr
/»/>/
)t+f'x«l-

2.

The accident occurred as follows:

3.

The injuries I sustained are:

4.

to
; and
The injury caused time off work from
C*tfJ?/ttr<htf~ 4>Crtx
faff
TT
I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse]

A.
B.
C.
D.

bfafc f'»fi^fo
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tfrfS^Sa//^

Temporary Partial Compensation L
X Medical Expenses
E._
/ ^ Recommended Medical Care
F._ pC Permanent Partial Compensation J.
Permanent Total Compensation
Higher Weekly Rate
G.~
X Temporary Total Compensation H. £ Travel Expenses

fft

Ml$</*lr

>C Interest
Other (Specify)_

My date of birth is
fT " 90' ^ f
At the time of injury my wage was $ /6-C<?
per ^ * y ~ ; and I was
l
working
/Cf
hours per week- Also, I w a s i H H H married and had
Ps
dependent children under age
18 when I was injured.
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages*]
Date:

/?*/£**/#

v?f- rt

S^yrr

Printed^Name of Employee -,

/fa/tsrtfc

Signature of Employee
:mpj
j^JL
* * * " '
Street Address of Employee
^

/??*,* CA? tvrs/

Street Address of Attorney for Employee
City/State/Zip Code

City/State/Zip Code of Employee
Telephone

j

Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number

UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION
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'

DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY TPTS FORM
A. List all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) treated, date of
treatment and nature of treatment.
B. Signed anJ notarized n*edickl authorizations - five more than total number of health care providers identified on the above list.
N

*
*

r *
*

c
e

c
*

t

»
*.

c

C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s).
D. In permanent total di^bilivs claims only, copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or
Appeals Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (form SSA 831-U5), if Social Security total disability has been
awarded.
" ,',
|
j
£. If represented bv an attorney, completed and signed Appointment of Counsel Form.

PERMANENT. TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY
A.
B.
C.
D.

Date disability began:
Age when disability began:
Last grade completed in school:
Diplomas/degrees/special education classes:

Present age:

E. English language difficulties:
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties^
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding employee's ability to return to work:

H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application date date ; Current status of pending claim I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts:

J. Names of Employers, years worked and description of work performed:
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; Award
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APPENDIX 10

Motion to Amend
Application for Hearing
and Join the Employers
Reinsurance Fund dated
August 28, 1996

Hans M. Scheffler (4246)
Attorney for Applicant
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ROLLAND A. BURGESS,
Applicant,

MOTION TO AMEND APPLICATION
FOR HEARING AND JOIN THE
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
Case Nos. 96283 & 96284

JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH

Judge Barbara A. Elicerio

Defendants.

Comes now the applicant, and through his attorney, moves the Industrial
Commission to allow him to amend his Applications for Hearing to include a claim for
permanent total disability benefits as well as additional temporary total disability
benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits and to join the Employers
Reinsurance Fund as a party to this claim.
This motion is based upon the decisions of Avis v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and Middlestadt v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993).
The Court in Middlestadt the Court of Appeal ruled that if an applicant knows
his condition to be unstable at the end of the limitation period, he could have filed

O01S2

before the time period has run.
In this case, the applicant and the defendants are aware of the ongoing
problems and medical care he is receiving due to his back injuries. As the Court of
Appeals stated in Avis v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 837
at 588 "[t]he workers' compensation statute, however, does not require stabilization
before filing for benefits."
By analogy, the workers' compensation statute does not require an applicant
to be total disabled before filing a claim for permanent total disability benefits. The
only alternative remedy available to an injury worker is to timely file his claim. Id.
WHEREFORE, the applicant respectfully moves to amend his Applications for
Hearing to include a claim for permanent total disability benefits as well as additional
temporary total disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits
and joining the Employers Reinsurance Fund as a party to this action.
Dated this 28th day of August 1996.

HansJVW^t^e«lar__.
Attorney for Applicant

2

( M * i c>o

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand delivered
to the following:
Richard Sumsion, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6 4 0 0 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Barbara Sharp, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P. 0 . Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Rolland A. Burgess
P. 0 . Box 104
Elmo, Utah 84521
Dated this 28th day of August 1996.

/
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APPENDIX 11

Motion to Continue Without
Date the Applicant's Claim
for Additional Benefits
dated August 28, 1996

Hans M. Scheffler (4246)
Attorney for Applicant
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6600

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ROLLAND A. BURGESS,

I

MOTION TO CONTINUE WITHOUT
DATE THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS

I

Case Nos. 96283 & 96284

]

Applicant,
v.
JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH

Judge Barbara A. Elicerio

Defendants.

Comes now the applicant, and through his attorney, moves the Industrial
Commission to continue without date his claim for permanent total disability benefits,
additional temporary total disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability
benefits.

This motion is based upon the fact that the applicant filed amended

Applications for Hearing to preserve his claim for these additional benefits and to
comply with the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Avis v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and Middlestadt v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993).

1

00185

WHEREFORE, the applicant respectfully moves that his claim for additional
benefits be continued without date.
Dated this 28th day of August 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand delivered
to the following:
Richard Sumsion, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Barbara Sharp, Esq.
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Employers Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P. 0. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Rolland A. Burgess
P. 0. Box 104
Elmo, Utah 84521
Dated this 28th day of Augustl^e^^—.^
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APPENDIX 12

Order on Motion to
Amend dated November

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 96283 and 96284

ROLLAND BURGESS,
Applicant/Petitioner,
vs.
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL
/WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH AND JWR CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY/WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,
Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER
ON MOTION
TO AMEND

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
28, 1996 at 3:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant/petitioner was represented by Hans
Scheffler, Attorney.
The respondent, Siaperas Sand & Gravel/Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by
Barbara Sharp, Attorney.
The
respondent,
JWR
Construction/Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by
Richard Sumsion, Attorney.

On March 25, 1996, the applicant/petitioner filed two
applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission, one with
respect to a July 1, 1990 industrial accident and one with respect
to
an
August
18,
1994
industrial
accident.
The
applicant/petitioner indicated on the applications for hearing that
he was claiming (in relevant part) medical expenses (accrued),
recommended medical care (i.e. future medical expenses), temporary
total compensation (TTC) and permanent impairment benefits (PPI) in
connection with both accidents. The matter was set for hearing,
but at the time of the hearing, or shortly thereafter, the TTC and
PPI claims were settled and a compensation agreement was approved
by the ALJ post-hearing, on October 28, 1996, documenting that
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RE: ROLLAND BURGESS
PAGE 2

settlement. At hearing, the attorneys indicated that they wanted
to discuss the claim for medical expenses, both past and future,
and how the statue of limitations should apply to those expenses.
This was done and at the conclusion of the hearing (treated
essentially
as
an
attorneys
conference
although
the
applicant/petitioner was available to testify) the claim for
medical expenses was also settled. The discussions regarding the
medical expense claim, and the resolution achieved with respect to
that claim, is documented in a post-hearing letter that the ALJ
sent to the parties (dated September 5, 1996).
At the conclusion of the hearing on August 28, 1996, counsel
for the applicant/petitioner submitted two motions with respect to
amendment of the application for hearing. Because those motions
were being submitted for the first time at the hearing, the ALJ
allowed the respondents 30 days in which to respond in writing to
those motions. The response was received at the Commission on
September 27, 1996, and the matter was considered ready for an
order on the motions at that time.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED:
The first motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner is
a Motion to Amend the applications for hearing to include claims
for future TTC, PPI and permanent total disability benefits (PTD).
The motion indicates that this request/motion was being made
pursuant to two Court of Appeals cases, Avis v. Board of Review.
837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), and Middlestadt v. Industrial
Commission,
852
P.2d
1012
(Utah
App.
1993).
The
applicant/petitioner suggests in his motion that these cases allow,
and may require, the filing of applications for hearing prior to
when an applicant/petitioner's claim is ready to be adjudicated.
The second motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner
indicates that the applicant/petitioner admits that the claims for
future benefits are not ready to be adjudicated at this time and
thus the motion seeks to have the amended application for hearing
continued without date (apparently meaning held in abeyance by the
Commission until such time as they are ready for adjudication).
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The respondents have filed a joint response to the motions
filed by the applicant/petitioner. The respondents argue that it
is inappropriate to hold cases in abeyance, where there is no way
of knowing when and if they will be ripe for adjudication and that
the failure to prosecute these claims necessitates a dismissal of
the claims. The respondents argue that the applicant/petitioner
cannot enlarge the statue of limitations by having a case continued
without date and asserts that the 6-year statute of limitations
currently specified in U.C.A. 35-1-98 applies to bar any further
claims on the applicant/petitioner's 1990 injury.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ understands how the Avis and Middlestadt cases have
been interpreted by many to allow a tolling of at least some of the
statutes of limitation found in the workers compensation laws.
However, the ALJ has to admit that she simply does not understand
what the court anticipated by those rulings. As is the case in
much of the case law, Commission rules and even in the statute, the
phrase "filing a claim" is used loosely without an indication
regarding whether this means filing a claim for benefits with the
carrier or filing an application for hearing with the Commission.
The court in both Avis and Middlestadt refers to "filing for an
increase," "filing for benefits, "file a compensation claim" but
never indicates with whom these claims are to be filed and never
refers to filing an application for hearing, which is the means of
invoking Commission jurisdiction. Therefore, the ALJ cannot say
that those cases reflect that filing an application for hearing, or
amending an application for hearing with the Commission, is
sufficient for tolling any certain filing limitation. In addition,
both cases deal with laws different from the statue of limitations
currently stated in U.C.A. 35-1-98 and thus it is uncertain if they
apply to that statute. In short, the ALJ cannot say that allowing
or disallowing the requested amendment in this case will have any
effect whatsoever on the applicant/petitioner's ability to make
future claims with respect to his 1990 or 1994 accident.
Not withstanding the discussion above, the ALJ understands
that some have interpreted the Avis and Middlestadt cases to
require the filing of an application for hearing for certain
benefits, before there is evidence of entitlement to those
benefits, in order to prevent the statute of limitations from
running. The ALJ understands that some attorneys even feel that it
may be malpractice to fail to simply make the filing, just in case
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it might toll the statute of limitations. Because the ALJ finds
that the law is very unclear in this area at this time, the ALJ
feels that she should allow the amendment to the claim, even though
the effect of allowing the same is not settled. The application
for hearing is therefore deemed amended to include a claim for
future TTC, PPI and PTD.
However, the ALJ is disinclined to
continue the matter without date.
The applicant/petitioner
concedes there is currently no supportive evidence for these
potential future claims and it is the Commission practice, or at
least the practice of this ALJ to dismiss, without prejudice.
applications for hearing that are not ready to be adjudicated.
Therefore, the applicant/petitioner's amended application for
hearing, claiming future TTC, PPI and PTD, is dismissed without
prejudice.
Once again, the ALJ must indicate that she takes no position
on what effect, if any, the requested amendments have on the
applicant/petitioner's right to claim future benefits related to
his 1990 and 1994 injuries. His right to future benefits will be
determined at the time that he makes those claims and they are
ready to be adjudicated. The ALJ also takes no position on what
statute of limitations applies to the 1990 and 1994 accidents as
this area of the law remains unsettled in the appellate courts.
The legislature continually amends the workers compensation laws
without indicating whether or not the amendment is intended to be
retroactive or not, leaving the retroactivity question related to
each new amendment to be litigated. In addition, the statute of
limitations may be different depending on the type of claim that
the applicant/petitioner may make in the future. Considering the
enormous questions involved with respect to what statute of
limitations may apply to any future claim, the ALJ finds it best to
leave this question open until such time as there is a concrete
claim to be decided.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant/petitioner's
MOTION TO AMEND APPLICATION FOR HEARING AND JOIN THE EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND is granted and the applicant/petitioner's MOTION
TO CONTINUE WITHOUT DATE THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL
BENEFITS is denied.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended claim is dismissed
without prejudice as there is no justiciable issue at this time.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (3 0) days of
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 6346b-12.

DATED this 22nd day of November, 1996.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
day of November, 1996,1 mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Order on Motion to Amend, in the case of Rolland Burgess v. Siaperas Sand
& Gravel and WCFU: and JWR Construction Co. And WCFU. (Case Nos. 96283, 96284),
to the following parties:
POSTAGE PREPAID:
ROLLAND A BURGESS
PO BOX 104
ELMO UT 84521
HANS SCHEFFLER, ESQ
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #380
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL:
BARBARA W SHARP, ESQ.
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
RICHARD SUMSION, ESQ.
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Kathy Houskeeper
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00296

Tab 13

APPENDIX 13

Order on Motions for
Review dated June 9,
1997

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ROLLAND BURGESS,

*
*
*

Applicant,

SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL ,
JWR CONSTRUCTION CO. and
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

*
*
*
*

ORDER ON MOTIONS
FOR REVIEW

Case Nos. 96-0283
and 96-0284

*

Defendants.

*

Each party in the above-entitled proceeding asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to
review the Administrative Law Judge's decision regarding Rolland Burgess' claim for benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over these motion for review pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUES PRESENTED
May Mr. Burgess amend his applications for workers' compensation benefits to include
possible future medical expenses and disability compensation? If Mr. Burgess is permitted to so
amend his applications, are the applications subject to dismissal on the grounds they fail to raise a
presently justiciable issue?

BACKGROUND
Mr. Burgess was injured in two separate work accidents, the first on July 1, 1990 while
employed by Siaperas Sand & Gravel, the second on August 18, 1994 while employed by JWR
Construction. On March 25, 1996, Mr. Burgess filed two applications seeking workers'
compensation benefits for his injuries from the two accidents.
Prior to the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Burgess' claims, the two employers and their
workers' compensation insurance carrier, The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, accepted
liability for Mr. Burgess' medical expenses and disability compensation with respect to his thenexisting condition. On August 28, 1996, Mr. Burgess moved to amend his applications for hearing
to include a claim for future benefits that might arise as a result of his work injuries.

00847

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR REVIEW
ROLLAND A. BURGESS
PAGE 2
The ALJ permitted Mr. Burgess to amend his applications to include claims for future
workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ then dismissed such claims without prejudice on the
grounds they were not ripe for adjudication .
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
WCF argues the ALJ erred in allowing Mr. Burgess to add claims for possible future
workers' compensation benefits to his current applications for hearing. However, after the ALJ
permitted Mr. Burgess to amend his applications, the ALJ dismissed the applications because they
had not yet ripened, and might never ripen, into any justiciable claim. When the amended
applications were dismissed, the alleged error in allowing amendment of the applications became
moot. Consequently, the Industrial Commission will not consider such objections further.
Mr. Burgess argues it was error for the ALJ to dismiss his amended applications. Although
Mr. Burgess concedes that, at this time, he has received all the workers' compensation benefits to
which he is entitled, he contends that unless his applications for hearing remain open, his right to
future benefits may be extinguished by the statute of limitations found in §35-1-98 of the Act. In
the Industrial Commission's opinion, Mr. Burgess misapprehends the effect of §35-1-98 of the Act.
It is a fundamental principle of Utah's workers' compensation system that the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate its "beneficent and humane objects".
North Beck Mining Co. V. Industrial Commission. 58 Utah 486,200 P. 111 (1921). In furtherance
of such purposes, §35-1-78(1) of the Act grants the Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction
over workers' compensation cases:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify
or change its former findings and orders.
The Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction is not unbridled. The Industrial
Commission can modify a workers' compensation award only when there is a significant change,
new development, or proof of the inadequacy of the previous award. Spencer v. Industrial
Commission. 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, the Industrial Commission's continuing
jurisdiction is subject to the limitations found in §35-1-78(3) of the Act:
(a) This section1 may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the
statute of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter
2, Utah Occupational Disease Act.

1

Referring to the section granting continuing jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission.
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(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred
to in Subsection (3)(a) in any respect.
It is therefore necessary to examine the specific language of the statute of limitations
applicable to claims for workers' compensation disability. That statute of limitations is found in
§35-1-98 of the Act:
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total
disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the
commission within six years after the date of the accident. (Emphasis added.)
Under the foregoing statute, the limitation period is tolled if an application for hearing is
filed within six years after the date of the accident. In this case, Mr. Burgess has filed an application
for hearing within the applicable six year period. Furthermore, by agreement of the parties, he
already has been determined eligible for some benefits under the workers' compensation system.
Consequently, by virtue of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction and the plain
language of §35-1-98(2), the Industrial Commission may exercise continuing jurisdiction over Mr.
Burgess' claim if he proves that a significant change has occurred in his condition.
In light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in this case, it is unnecessary
to hold Mr. Burgess' applications for hearing open. Instead, Mr. Burgess may request that the
Industrial Commission reopen the matter if future developments warrant such a request.2
In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the Industrial Commission has carefully considered
the Utah Court of Appeals' decisions in Avis v. Bd. of Review. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and
Middlestad v. Industrial Commission. 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). However, in neither case
did the court consider the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction under §35-1-78(1) of the
Act.3 The Industrial Commission also notes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Stoker v. The
Workers' Compensation Fund. 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994), in which the Court suggests the
Industrial Commission retains continuing jurisdiction in cases such as this.
In summary, the Industrial Commission concludes that because the issue raised in WCF's
motion for review is moot, no purpose is served by considering the matter further. The Industrial

2

Of course, at such time, Mr. Burgess will be required to "overcome the substantial issues of
causation" that may then exist. Stoker v. Industrial Commission. 889 P.2d 409,412 (Utah 1994).
3

The Industrial Commission notes that the parties neither raised nor briefed the issue of the
Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in either Avis or Middlestadt.
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Commission further concludes that, in light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction
to consider Mr. Burgess' right to additional benefits when and if such rights accrue, there is no need
to hold Mr. Burgess' current applications open. Consequently, the ALJ properly dismissed such
applications.
ORDER
On the grounds stated herein, the Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and
denies both Mr. Burgess' and WCF's motions for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this #ji}day of June, 1997.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request
for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within
30 days of the date of this order.
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Burgess, Case No.96-0283 & 96-0284 was mailed first class postage prepaid this^/ffi day of June,
1997, to the following:

BARBARA W. SHARP
ATTORNEY AT LAW
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
P O BOX 57929
MURRAY, UTAH 84157
HANS M. SCHEFFLER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
311 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 380
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
ROLLAND A. BURGESS
P O BOX 104
ELMO, UTAH 84521
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL
6135 EAST NORTH COAL CREEK
WELLINGTON, UTAH 84501
JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC.
PO BOX 1410
HUNTINGTON, UTAH 84528

si£is*JL& ~hM/M
Adell Butler^Mttchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah

ordcrs\96-0283

00351

Tab 14

APPENDIX 14

United
States
Smelting,
Refining
and Mining Co. v.
Nielsen,
430 P.2d 162 (Utah
1967)

UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFINING AND MINING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Paul D. NIELSEN, and the Industrial Commission of Utah,
Defendants
No. 10703
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
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HENRIOD, Justice, wrote the opinion.
CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
AUTHOR: HENRIOD
OPINION

HENRIOD, Justice.
Appeal from an Industrial Commission award. Reversed.
Applicant, Nielsen, after working for the Smelting Company for 10 days, was injured by a
cave-in in 1952. Among other things he injured his knee. The company, as self-insurer, paid
statutory compensation for a period of time under Sec. 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953,1
which provided for payment upwards of six years from the date of the injury. After he had been
paid compensation periodically for a time under the statute, Nielsen requested and received a
lump sum settlement of his claim in order to go into private business, which he did, and which he
pursed until 1965, when he had his knee cap removed, in the process of which he suffered partial
paralysis of his hands and arms because of operative or post-operative faulty blood circulation.
He filed a claim for further compensation, and an award was made apparently because of the
decision of this Court in Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission,^ which decision cited
Hardy v. Industrial Commission, 3 as a precedent for the proposition that the date when
compensation accrues is that date when disability occurs, i.e., on a casualty, not a calendar year
basis, - or, in other words, upon discovery of an injury. The Apex observations with respect to
this were distum based on the Hardy decision, but the law of the Apex case strictly was based on
an estoppel.
The Hardy case was decided in 1936 under the partial disability statute then existing,"*
whose wording was as follows:
Where the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive during such
disability, and for a period of not to exceed six years, etc. * * *.
At that time the temporary disability statute that immediately preceded the above section, 5
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read as follows:
* * * In no case shall such compensation continue for more than six years from the date of
the injury * * *.
In 1939 the legislature amended the section on partial disability to read as follows:^
* * * the employee shall receive, during such disability, and for a period of not to exceed six
years from the date of injury, etc. * * *.
The Hardy case did not discuss the temporary disability statute, apparently because, although
Mr. Hardy seemed to have been temporarily disabled as well as partially disabled, the court
considered that the wording of the temporary disability statute represented a true limitations
statute, rendering uncompensable any disability developed more than six years after the date of
the injury, or accident. *
It seems inescapable to conclude other than that the 1939 legislature intended to meet the
interpretation of the Hardy case by clearing up the question as to time when a claim must be
presented, and to indicate that when an industrial accident occurs on a certain date, any disability
resulting therefrom is compensable during six years after such accident occurred, and to make
uniform the partial disability and temporary disability sections as to duration of payment of
compensation.
It seems significant that the Apex case did not decide the issue posed in the Hardy case, and
that there appears to be no Utah case to date that has or could have followed the latter case after
the 1939 amendment, except on some rare occasion, such as voluntary conferral of authority to
decide a matter as appears to be the case in Apex.
It seems significant also that in McKee v. Industrial Commission? in a case involving the
filing of a claim within three years** which provides that:
"If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years from
the date of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to
compensation shall be wholly barred,'1
the author had this to say:
"Regardless of the decisions rendered by this court prior to 1939, the law now is that the
limitation statute begins to run from the date of the accident or from the date of the last payment
of compensation."
In a concurring opinion in the Apex case, Mr. Justice Wolfe had this to say:
"Furthermore, there are comparatively few cases where disability arises more than three years
after the accident or recurs three years after the last payment. And as to those cases the statute
was meant to provide for a period after which the insurance carrier could safely cease to carry
reserves against a definite accident. The matter of whether an over-all period of three years is too
short is for the legislature. There will undoubtedly be cases of hardship where an man will
suffer a residual disability from an old injury."
We agree with both of these quotations and can see no difference in logic, philosophy or
legislative intent since 1939, as to the six-year limitation.
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Defendant in this case say that Sec. 42-1-72, Utah Code Annotated 1943 (35-1-78, Utah
Code Annotated 1953) overrides the six-year limitation statutes when it says that:
"The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it
may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or
orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified."
We have no quarrel with the above statute, but construe it to mean the commission has
continuing jurisdiction only during the period of the limitations statutes mentioned above,^ and
has nothing to do with the abrogation of or exception to such limitations statutes. Our conclusion
about legislative intent seems to be borne out by Sec. 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, which allows for
destruction of records after 10 years, at the discretion of the Commission.
We think the review in this case is well taken for several reasons: 1) the Apex case is not
pertinent; 2) the three-year limitations statute is applicable; 3) the six-year statute is applicable,
if, for no other reason than that Nielsen, in accepting the lump sum settlement at his own instance
and request, did so in exchange for and in lieu of any six-year compensation to which he would
be entitled, thus exhausting his claim; 4) that the three and six-year statutes are ones of repose,
which we think the legislature intended should terminate, not encourage protraction of claims, otherwise, an employer could and would be an insurer for the natural lives of its employees,
based on real or imaginary discoveries of erstwhile latent injuries; 5) that the Workmen's
compensation Laws were and are designed to provide sustenance to a family for a statutory time
until it can become readjusted in industry; and 6) that Nielsen, in his own application set both the
date of injury and disability at the same time, so that really there is no problem as to dates of
accident, disability or discovery.
CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
DISSENT

ELLETT, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
In this case Paul D. Nielsen sustained a compensable injury in 1952. He was awarded
compensation at the rate of $30.25 per week for a period of 124 3/7 weeks. The payment for the
last 54 weeks was discounted at 3 per cent compounded annually and paid to him in a lump sum.
Almost 13 years later the old injury to his knee flared up, and he had his knee cap removed,
along with other operative procedures on his leg, on April 12, 1965. The plaintiff herein paid the
expenses of that operation. However, complications arose because of the operation, and he has
sustained ulnar injuries amounting to 13 per cent of the total man. The testimony before the
Industrial Commission warranted a finding that the ulnar disorder resulted from the knee
operation, and the knee operation was a result of the compensable injury sustained in 1952. At a
hearing on May 4, 1966, the Industrial Commission ordered the plaintiff herein to pay 24 weeks
additional payments of $30.25 each.
Before the Commission the plaintiff denied liability because, among other things, the statute
of limitations had run and the Commission exceeded its authority in making the order.
The question we have to determine then is the interpretation we should place upon Section
35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which so far as material here was Section 42-1-62, Utah
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Code Annotated 1943. That section in substance provides: "Where the injury causes partial
disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such disability, and for a period of not to
exceed six years from the date of the injury, a weekly compensation * * *."
A similar matter was before the Supreme Court in the case of Utah Apex Mining Company,
et al. v. Industrial Commission, et al. 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571. In that case one Peterson
sustained injuries on May 20, 1931, while an employee of the Utah Apex Mining Company.
There was a dispute as to whether or not the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to make an
award. That dispute was not material to the part of the case in which we are now interested.
Petersen continued in the employ of Utah Apex Mining Company until 1938 and submitted
himself to a doctor generally once a month. The doctor testified that the leg was never entirely
free from infection during any of this period. On December 29, 1947, the doctor informed the
Utah Apex Mining Company that he had hospitalized Peterson because of osteomyelitis of the
left leg and that this condition was a residual of the original injury.
The Utah Apex Mining Company contended that the Industrial Commission could not act in
the matter because Petersen's right was barred under the provision of Section 42-1-61, R.S.U.
1933, which statute applied to the recovery of temporary disability and so far as material reads as
follows: "In case of temporary disability the employee shall receive 60 per cent of his average
weekly wages so long as such disability is total * * *. In no case shall such compensation
continue for more than six years from the date of the injury."
At page 311 of the 116 Utah Reports, at page 574 of 209 P.2d this court said:
Section 42-1-61 must be read in the light of 42-1-72 R.S.U. 1933. That statute provides that
the jurisdiction of the Commission in compensation cases shall be continuing without mention of
any period of time after which that jurisdiction shall come to an end. That statute provides:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified.
The case of Hardy v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15, 17, is instructive of
the manner in which these sections are to be resolved. In that case it was urged that under
42-1-62, R.S.U. 1933, the Commission lost jurisdiction upon the expiration of six years from the
date of the injury. The principal difference between that statute and the section preceding it,
which is the statute here involved, is that Section 62 announces the law applicable in cases of
partial disability whereas Section 61 covers cases of temporary disability. However, the statutes
are, in substance, identical when we limit our consideration to the provision that payment of
compensation shall not continue for more than six years from the date of the injury. Inasmuch as
this is the only provision in either statute with which we are here concerned, the reasoning of this
court in that case is applicable here. We there held that the provision that payment of
compensation should not continue for more than six years from the date of the injury was only
meant to fix the period during which payment is to extend, that is, the disability period, and that
it was not in conflict with 42-1-72, supra, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Commission
shall be continuing. We there said:
We discover no conflict between section 42-1-62 and section 42-1-72, supra. The latter
section is one relating to jurisdiction only. The former relates to the amount to be paid and the
period during which the payment shall extend. "Where the injury causes partial disability for
work, the employee shall receive during such disability and for a period of not to exceed six
years" the compensation provided for by the statute. Reading the whole section, it is apparent the
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part under consideration and last above quoted has the same effect and meaning as though it
read: "When the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such
disability * * * not to exceed six years, the compensation specified."
The limitation provided by the section relates to the disability period and not the calendar
period dating from the injury.
The facts in the case of Hardy v. Industrial Commission cited above are as follows:
Hardy sustained a compendable injury on October 25, 1927. His insurance carrier assumed
liability and paid compensation including the necessary medical expenses incurred in healing the
injury. At the conclusion of the period of temporary disability and at the time applicant was
discharged, it was recommended by the attending physician that a further operation be
performed. The insurance carrier agreed at that time, to wit, during the winter of 1929 and 1930,
to pay the costs of such operation ordered to be performed. However, the operation was not
performed at that time and was not called to the attention of either the employer or its insurance
carrier until more than six years had elapsed after the initial injury and only after the application
had gone to another surgeon and had the operation performed. The insurance carrier was then
requested to pay for the operation and other medical care incident to the operation. Hardy made
application for further compensation, all of which was after the elapse of more than six years
from the date of the injury.
The insurance carrier denied liability and claimed that Section 42-1-62, R.S.U. 1933, which
is now 35-1-66, U.C.A. 1953, prevented the Commission from making an award after the
expiration of six years from the date of the injury.
In disposing of the contention, this court at page 567 of the Utah Reports, at page 17 of 58
P.2d used the following language:
It would be an unusual construction to say that an employee injured by accident in the course
of his employment should be denied compensation because an injury had apparently been
surgically cured, but which was in fact quiescent for a period and without an additional injury,
but, in the course of progress of the injury, it again became a disability precluding remunerative
employment, that the employee should be denied compensation for the subsequent period. Some
injuries apparently only temporary become permanent, and disabling injuries for a period may be
partial and then become total. Injuries thought to be total may become temporary and even
complete recovery may result. * * *
In the instant case, the application and the hearing thereon, acceptance of liability by the
carrier placed the matter under the jurisdiction of the commission, and whether there were
express findings or an award or not, the commission had power and jurisdiction to make or deny
an award as the merits of the case might determine. It is just as important that the commission
should have an opportunity to reconsider its findings or to make findings if the making of
findings has been temporarily unnecessary because of agreement as it is to review and consider
its findings on a previous award when new conditions required the exercise of the continuing
jurisdiction conferred by the statute.
In that case the Industrial Commission had refused to make an award because it assumed the
position now taken by the plaintiff herein. The order of the Industrial Commission was vacated,
and the cause was remanded for further proceedings.
I think these two cases dispose of the contention made by plaintiff and require us to hold that
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the six-year limitation is a limitation upon the number of payments which can be made to an
injured workman and has nothing to do with when payments must be stopped. To hold otherwise
would lead to a unique situation if the injury was not disabling for a period of five years, and by
the time the hearings were terminated the six-year period would have passed. Such could not
have been in contemplation of the Legislature in enacting the statute.
It should also be noted that the Industrial Commission has interpreted the statute involved
herein to mean casualty years and not a period of limitation, and since this holding of the
Commission has been continuous for some 27 years, the Legislature by not changing this statute
would have given its tacit approval to the interpretation placed thereon by the Commission. Of
course, if the holding of the Commission was clearly at variance with the law, we would not
hesitate to strike it down, although long acquiescence might have been given to the
interpretation. In this case I think the interpretation placed by the Commission is correct, and the
order of the Commission should be affirmed.
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 See prior statutes, leading up to the Section: Sec. 42-1-62, Utah code Annotated 1943 and 1933.
2 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949).
3 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936).
4 Sec. 42-1-62, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933.
5 Sec. 42-1-61, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. (Sec. 35-1-65, U.C.A. 1953).
6 Chap. 51, Laws of Utah 1939. (Sec. 42-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1943).
7 115 Utah 550, 206 P.2d 715 (1949).
8 Sec. 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated 1943; Jones v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 28, 404 P.2d
27(1965).
9 West's Ann. Calif. Codes, Labor, Sec. 5410.
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JUDGES
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Gregory
K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge. Zimmerman, Chief Justice, concurs in the result. Orme, Court of
Appeals Judge, sat to fill the vacancy on the Court.
AUTHOR: STEWART
OPINION

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
Kyle Stoker filed a complaint in the district court seeking a ruling that Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-65(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is unconstitutional under Article I, Section
11 of the Utah Constitution insofar as it provides that no temporary total disability benefits may
be paid after eight years from the time of an injury-causing accident. The district court held the
provision constitutional, and Stoker appeals.
Stoker injured his lower back on October 13, 1982, and again on November 15, 1982, while
working for a construction company as a laborer. His back condition deteriorated, and surgery
was performed on January 13, 1987. The Industrial Commission awarded Stoker temporary total
disability benefits in the amount of $ 4,788.76 for an approximately 22-week period from
December 24, 1986, through May 24, 1987. The Commission also awarded Stoker partial
disability benefits in the amount of $ 6,627.85, medical expenses, and attorney fees.
After his surgery, Stoker's back condition continued to deteriorate. In May 1990, less than
eight years from the date of his injury, Stoker's treating physician advised the Workers'
Compensation Fund ("Fund") that because of chronic unrelenting pain, Stoker should be
evaluated for spinal fusion surgery. However, Stoker and his doctor decided first to try the more
conservative treatment provided by a pain clinic program to try to avoid surgery. The Fund
authorized and paid for that therapy, but it was unsuccessful. In January 1991, Stoker underwent
a spinal fusion.
Stoker applied for additional temporary total disability benefits for the period relating to the
second surgery. The Commission denied the application based on the eight-year time limitation
on temporary total disability benefits in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65(1). In pertinent part, that
section states: "In no case shall such [temporary total disability] compensation benefits exceed
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312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
period of eight years from the date of the injury. ,f (Emphasis added.) Under this provision,
temporary total disability benefits are subject to three limitations: (1) they are payable only for a
maximum of 312 weeks (2) at a rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage, and (3) the
benefits must be paid within eight years of the date of the injury, even if they have been paid to
an injured worker for less than 312 weeks when the eight-year period expires.
Stoker argues that the eight-year period violates the Due Process and Open Courts provisions
in Article 1, Sections 7 and 11, respectively, of the Utah Constitution because the limitation is an
unconstitutional statute of repose under Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985), and Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), or an unconstitutional cap on damages under the ruling in
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
The Fund argues that the eight-year provision is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute
of repose because it does not totally bar compensation. Rather, the Fund argues, the provision
limits only the total amount of temporary total disability benefits and the time within which an
injured worker can receive such benefits, whether the benefits claimed are the total allowable or
less than the total allowable. The Fund also states that such benefits are part of an array of
remedies provided by the Act, some of which can continue indefinitely. See Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 597 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1979); see also Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-99(2) (1988).
Because Stoker failed to present to the trial court his due process claim and the claim that the
limitations in § 35-1-65(1) constitute an unconstitutional cap on damages, we decline to address
those claims. We therefore address only the claim that § 35-1-65(1) is an unconstitutional statute
of repose.
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that provides remedies
for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu
of common law tort actions. The Act provides temporary total disability benefits, § 35-1-65;
temporary partial disability benefits, § 35-1-65.1; permanent partial and permanent total
disability benefits, § 35-1-81; and medical expenses for injured employees, § 35-1-81, as well as
certain other benefits. These remedies, whether viewed individually or together, are not
analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judgment that the common law provides for personal injury
actions. Not only may benefits be paid over a period of time rather than in a lump-sum judgment,
but an award of benefits does not generally have the res judicata effect of a judgment.
While it is not clear why the Legislature imposed both a 312-week limitation and an
eight-year limitation on temporary total disability benefits, we presume that those provisions are
constitutional. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819
P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1991); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah
1991). They clearly are not facially unconstitutional under Berry and its progeny. It is the
burden of one attacking the constitutionality of a statutory provision to demonstrate that the
provision is unconstitutional.
Whether a statute that bars or terminates a claim for relief is a statute of limitations or a
statute of repose depends on the nature of the statute and the manner in which it operates to cut
off the legal right of a person to obtain a remedy for an injury. Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 575-76; see
also Berry, 717 P.2d at 672; Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1158-59 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994); Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

3

Although § 35-1-65 might act to cut off a claim a worker may have for temporary total disability
benefits and possibly raise a constitutional issue under Berry, 1 that is not the case here.
In this case, § 35-1-65 did not operate as a statute of repose. The eight-year bar did not
preclude Stoker from asserting a claim for temporary total disability benefits. In fact, he did
assert a claim. He received such benefits from December 24, 1986, through May 24, 1987. He
could even have received a second award of such benefits for temporary total disability resulting
from surgery for a condition causally connected to his industrial accident if he had known of the
necessity for additional medical treatment and had undergone the surgery prior to the expiration
of the eight-year period.
Stoker must have known that a spinal fusion would result in a period of temporary total
disability. He lost the right to file a second time for temporary total disability benefits as a result
of his choice of the type of treatment he wanted to undertake within the limited time left under
the statute. The eight-year limitation barred his remedy because of the choice he made. That kind
of bar does not operate as a statute of repose under Berry and its progeny. See Gaufin, 867 P.2d
at 576.
Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy under the Act. It would be ironic for the Act to
be construed in such a fashion that a worker who undertakes a conservative course of therapy
within the time allowed by the statute, which if effective would save the Fund money and be less
risky to the worker, would be denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a more
aggressive therapy must then be pursued, resulting in temporary total disability that occurs
outside the eight-year period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken at the time of the
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met the requirements for additional total disability
benefits.
The Industrial Commission and the Fund both seem to recognize as much in their brief. They
state:
For the purposes of WCF's Brief and for that purpose only WCF concedes the plaintiff
experienced a period of temporary total disability related to his industrial accident of
October 13, 1982, while employed by Big D Construction Company more than eight
years after his industrial accident. Plaintiff should be put to his burden of proof before the
Industrial Commission of Utah to prove that any continuing problem is reasonably related
to his industrial accident.

The brief then states, "The Commission has continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior award
herein pursuant to Section 35-1-78 U.C.A."2 Section 35-l-78(3)(b) provides, however, that "the
commission has no power to change the [applicable] statutes of limitations." In short, Stoker may
ask the Commission to reopen and modify its prior award if Stoker can overcome the substantial
issues of causation that exist.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Gregory K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge
Zimmerman, Chief Justice, concurs in the result.
Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, sat to fill the vacancy on the Court.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.

OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 See also Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Wrolstad v. Industrial
Comm'n, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) provides in part: "The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over
each case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or
change its prior findings and orders."
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
AUTHOR: BENCH
OPINION

BENCH, Judge:
Petitioner, Paul J. Middlestadt, seeks review of the Industrial Commission's denial of his
request for additional temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
Middlestadt was injured in industrial accidents occurring in 1976 and in 1980. In 1985, he
was awarded temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits.
Middlestadt subsequently underwent two operations (one in 1987 and one in 1990) that were
necessitated by the industrial accidents. In 1991, Middlestadt filed for additional temporary total
disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits based on his condition
following the operations. 1
Middlestadt's claims were dismissed sua sponte by an administrative law judge. Middlestadt
appealed to the Industrial Commission and the dismissal was affirmed.^ The Industrial
Commission held that the claims were barred under the eight year "statutes of limitation'1 found
in Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65 and -66 (1977).3 Middlestadt petitioned this court to review the
Industrial Commission's ruling.
ANALYSIS
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Middlestadt asserts that the limitations upon his ability to file a claim found in sections
35-1-65 and -66 violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art.
I, § l l . 4 Middlestadt relies upon Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985),
claiming that the statutory limitations unconstitutionally require him to file a claim before it has
accrued. He asserts that his claims did not accrue until after the operations in 1987 and 1990.
Consequently, the key issue in this case is whether Middlestadt's claim accrued at the time of the
industrial accidents or when he had the operations.
I his court recently held in Avis v. Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992)
cert, denied, No. 920559 (Utah Feb. 24, 1993) (interpreting a similar statute of limitation found
in section 35-1-99), that a worker's cause of action accrues when the industrial accident occurs. A
statute requiring filing within a set period following the accident is therefore a statute of
limitation, not a statute of repose. Id. at 587-88.
In Avis, this court expressly rejected a proposed rule that a statute of limitation not run until
the petitioner "discovered" the full extent of his injury. Id. at 588. Middlestadt makes the same
argument in this case, urging that the statutes of limitation found in sections 35-1-65 and -66
should not begin to run until he knows the full extent of his injury, i.e., until after his subsequent
operations. He has not, however, shown why the analysis set forth in Avis regarding section
35-1-99 should not apply with equal force to sections 35-1-65 and -66. We find the Avis analysis
applicable here.
Middlestadt has not presented any argument that the statutes, as applied to him, are
unconstitutional. He knew of his accident within the eight-year limitation period, and his first
operation occurred within the period. He did not, however, seek to amend his award until after
the time periods had run. Our conclusion that his claim is time-barred is not altered by the fact
that his second operation occurred after the time period had run. If Middlestadt knew that his
condition was still unstable at the end of the time period, he could have filed for an increase in
his permanent partial disability to allow for any future loss of earnings under section 35-1-66. If
he did not anticipate future disability, then he is no worse off than he would have been in a civil
suit where he would have been required, but unable, to prove his future damages.
In keeping with the holding and analysis of Avis, we hold that the time provisions found in
sections 35-1-65 and -66 of the Workers' Compensation Act do not, on their face or as applied to
Middlestadt, violate the open courts provision.
CONCLUSION
Middlestadt's claims for additional benefits were time-barred. We therefore affirm the
Industrial Commission's dismissal of Middlestadt's claims.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
J u i i t h V.

....

/•

•.. •:,.

Gregory k * -me, JUOMC
OPINION FOOTNOTES
1 I he parties agree that Middlestadt's medical costs are covered by the original award. We therefore
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc 4 II Rights Reserved.

3
only address Middlestadt's claims for disability benefits arising from his inability to work following the
operations.
2 We noted our concerns about sua sponte actions by administrative tribunals in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24-25 (Utah App. 1993). In that
case, we reversed a sua sponte ruling of the Tax Commission. The sua sponte action in Middlestadt's
case, by comparison, was taken by an administrative law judge and was never challenged in subsequent
proceedings before the Industrial Commission. We therefore do not reverse; nevertheless, we caution
administrative tribunals generally about the pitfalls of sua sponte action.
3 These sections have since been amended. A six-year limitation period is now found in section
35-1-98 (Supp. 1992)
4 Middlestadt asserts, in the alternative, that these sections violate the equal protection provision of
the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Middlestadt does not, however, present us with any
legal analysis to support the claim as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (an
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issue
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on"). "Absent a
compelling reason why we should waive application of rule 24(a)(9), we do not address [appellant's]
contention." First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 62 (Utah 1993).

(c) 1992-1997 by Michic, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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presents a jurisdictional question. See A.J.
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n. 2
(1973). We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's motion as it was untimely.
However, even if we were to reach the
merits of defendant's motion to set aside
his guilty plea, we would still affirm. We
have already concluded that defendant's
plea was entered in compliance with Rule
11(5) and Gibbons and, thus, that defendant's plea was voluntary. Therefore, defendant's first ground for setting aside his
plea is without merit. However, defendant
also claims the trial court erred by not
allowing defendant to withdraw his plea in
view of new evidence favorable to defendant.

view of that holding, it is unnecessary (and
improper) to opine about the merits of defendant's motion.

[7, 8] A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to set aside a guilty plea in
light of new evidence.5 In the present
case, during defendant's pro se argument
to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant stated the basis for his motion was his and his
neighbors' belief in his innocence.
On appeal, defendant argues the testimony of his neighbors presents new, exculpatory evidence. However, as the State
notes, defendant fails to present affidavits
from potential witnesses or even a plausible version of the facts more favorable to
him. Defendant's motion was supported
only by defendant's statement that he was
not guilty and his self-serving conjecture
that others believed him innocent. These
"new" facts are not sufficient to set aside
his plea.

Aug. 31, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1992.

GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring
specially):
We hold in this case that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In
5. See, e.g., State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424
(Utah 1987) (trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea because
of the "implausible timing and suspicious content" of new evidence favorable to defendant);
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah

Earl N. AVIS, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; and Salt Lake City
Corporation, Respondents.
No. 910574-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

Claimant appealed from order of the
Industrial Commission dismissing claim for
compensation on limitations grounds. The
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
statute of limitations did not violate equal
protection or "open courts" constitutional
provisions.
Affirmed.
1. Workers* Compensation <3=>1939.1
Deference is granted to Industrial
Commission's application of law to particular facts only when there is grant of discretion to agency concerning language in
question, either expressly made in statute
or implied from statutory language.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed).
2. Workers' Compensation e=>1090
Because Industrial Commission is not
court of general jurisdiction, it lacked authority to address constitutionality of work1987) (trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw guilty plea because of "critical new evidence which cast doubt on defendant's guilt," i.e., victim's admission that her
testimony at preliminary hearing wrongly implicated defendant).

AVIS v. BOARD OF RE LEW OF INDUS. COM'N
CUe a* 837 ?2d !

rs' compensation statute of limitations.
f.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed).
3. Workers' Compensation «=»1269
Statute providing that workers' compensation claim was barred if not filed with
Industrial Commission within three years
from date of accident was "statute of limitations/' rather than "statute of repose";
statute ran from date of injury, when cause
of action accrued, and not from point in
time unrelated to when cause of action
arose. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4 Limitation of Actions <s=D4(2)
State legislatures possess discretion to
enact statutes of limitations, and these
statutes are presumptively constitutional.
5 Workers* Compensation <s=>39
Statute providing that workers' compensation claim was barred if not filed with
Industrial Commission within three years
from date of accident did not violate "open
courts" provision of Utah Constitution as
applied to claimant who knew of injury
within limitations period. U.C.A.1953, 351-99 (Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 11.
6. Constitutional Law <3=>245(4)
Workers' Compensation G=39
Workers' compensation statute of limitations did not violate equal protection; restriction against claims for permanent partial disability after statute of limitations
had run did not discriminate unlawfully
against those who had not been rated within that time frame. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99
(Repealed); Const Art. 1, § 24.
Brian D. Kelm (argued), Salt Lake City,
for petitioner.
Ray G. Montgomery, Asst. City Atty.
^argued), Salt Lake City, for respondent
' <'• Lake City Corp
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
1

In 1990, the City obtained a rating for petitioner, attributing half the permanent partial dis-
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioner, Earl N. Avis, appeals from an
Industrial Commission (Commission) order
dismissing his claim for compensation on
the basis that it was filed after the applicable three year statute of limitations had
expired. We affirm the Commission's order.

BACKGROUND
Because the Commission dismissed petitioner's claim without a full hearing on the
facts, "we presume, to the extent necessary to resolve the issues on appeal, that
the facts are as stated by petitioner." Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123,
124 n. 2 (Utah App.1992).
Petitioner was employed as a police officer for Salt Lake City (the City) when he
was injured on the job, July 4, 1968. The
left rear wheel of his three wheel motorcycle hit a large chuck hole, jarring his back.
Petitioner promptly reported the accident
and was examined by a doctor whom the
city designated. He was treated for recurring back pain from 1968 to 1982. After
consulting a different physician, petitioner
underwent back surgery in February of
1986. The City authorized payment for all
medical expenses connected with the injury. In 1988, petitioner's treating physician
rated him for permanent partial impairment due to his back.1
Petitioner filed a claim with the Commission on December 4, 1990, seeking a permanent, partial disability award. The administrative law judge (AU) ruled that the
statute of limitations in Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-99 (1974) barred petitioner's claim. Following a motion for review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's
ruling. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
Petitioner argues on appeal that Utah
Code Annotated section 35-1-99 (1974) violates the Utah Constitution's open courts
ability to pre-existing conditions and half to the
July 4, 1968 industrial injury.
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provision and deprives him of equal protection as guaranteed in the Utah Constitution. Section 35-1-99 provides that "[i]f no
claim for compensation is filed with the
industrial commission within three years
from the date of the accident . . . the right
to compensation shall be wholly barred.,, 2

discretion to the Commission to apply the
statute to the facts, and counsel have not
identified any implicit grant of discretion.
We therefore address the application of the
statute in this case using a correction of
error standard of review. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows this court to grant relief
where the Commission "has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law," Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), or where
"the statute or rule on which the agency
action is based, is unconstitutional on its
face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4Xa) (1989). "[W]to>n reviewing an
application or interpretation of law we use
a correction of error standard, giving no
deference to the Commission's interpretation of the law." Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah
1992) (citing Savage Indus, v. State Tax
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah
1991)). Deference is granted to the Commission's "application of the law to particular facts only when 'there is a grant of
discretion to the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in
the statute or implied from the statutory
language/ " Stokes v. Board of Review,
832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App.1992) (quoting
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581,
589 (Utah 1991)); See also Anderson, 839
P.2d at 824. Because the Commission is
not a court of general jurisdiction, it lacked
authority to address the constitutionality of
the statute. See Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123, 125 n. 5 (Utah App.
1992). We therefore address the issue of
the statute's facial validity for the first
time on appeal as a question of law. Further, there is no explicit statutory grant of

ANALYSIS

Petitioner urges this court to construe
the statute of limitations in Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-99 (1974) under the
due process analysis provided in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 672
(Utah 1985), and a subsequent line of cases
in which statutes of repose were held to
violate the open courts provision of the
Utah Constitution. In Berry and subsequent cases, "Utah courts have interpreted
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution to proscribe statutes of repose
unless the statutes have certain redeeming
characteristics." Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App.1992).
Utah's open courts provision guarantees a
person access to the courts "for an injury
done to him in his person, property or
reputation." Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. A
statute of repose satisfies the open courts
provision if it "provides an injured person
an effective and reasonable alternative
remedy 'by due course of law1 for vindication of his constitutional interest" Berry,
717 P.2d at 680 (quoting Utah Const. Art. I,
§ 11). "[I]f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy . . . may be justified only if there is
a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated...." Id.

2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1974) was amended in 1988 to extend the time for filing a claim
to six years. The statute was amended again in
1990 and recodified in section 35-1-98(2)
(1991). This particular provision was left essentially the same and now reads in pertinent part:
A claim for compensation for temporary
total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability

benefits, or permanent total disability benefits
is wholly barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed with the commission within
six years after the date of the accident.
Petitioner requests that the current six-year
limitations period also be declared unconstitutional. However, our ruling on the earlier statute's constitutionality renders this point moot.

Open Courts Provision

Petitioner claims his case is analogous to
Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d
243 (Utah App.1990), in which this court
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held that a statute of repose in the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Act violated the open courts provision. In Wrolstad
this court determined that a statute which
operated to preclude a worker from filing
an occupational disease claim before the
worker was aware of the disease because
of an absence of symptoms for many years,
and which failed to provide an alternative
for compensation, violated the open courts
provision. Petitioner in the present case
argues that receiving a permanent, partial
disability rating twenty years after a job
related injury is equivalent to a worker
being exposed to asbestos, and then having
a diagnosis of asbestosis occur many years
later. Petitioner contends that, just as the
worker exposed to asbestos cannot file an
occupational disease claim for a disease of
which he is unaware, he could not have
filed his claim for disability benefits until
he received a disability rating. Additionally, petitioner argues that there is no reasonable alternative remedy available to him
under the workers' compensation statute
because a claim for benefits from the City
is his exclusive remedy.
Every case petitioner cites in support of
his open courts argument addresses statutes of repose. He has cited no cases in
which a statute of limitations was held to
violate the open courts provision. He argues, however, that there is no meaningful
difference between statutes of repose and
statutes of limitation and that we therefore
should apply Berry and its progeny to section 35-1-99. We do not agree that the
two types of statutes are essentially identical.
[3] "A statute of repose . . . prevents
suit a statutorily specified number of years
after a particular event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action accrues."
Velarde, 831 P.2d at 125 (citation omitted).
"A statute of limitations precludes suit a
statutorily specified number of years after
a cause of action accrues." Id. "[S]tatutes of limitations 'are designed to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-

peared.' " Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d
84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of R.R.
Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct 582, 586, 88 L.Ed.
788 (1944)). Section 35-1-99 is a statute of
limitations because it runs from the date of
injury, when the cause of action accrues,
not from a point in time unrelated to when
the cause of action arose. As a result, the
Berry line of cases is not directly applicable, but we consider their general constitutional analysis under the open courts provision. We also examine cases involving
statutes of limitations.
[4] State legislatures possess the discretion to enact statutes of limitations, and
these statutes are presumptively constitutional. See McHenry v. Utah Valley
Hosp., 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.Utah 1989).
"[A] statute of limitations is constitutionally sound if it should allow a reasonable, not
unlimited, time in which to bring suit" Id.
" '[W]hat shall be considered a reasonable
time must be settled by the judgment of
the legislature, and the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed
is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice/" Id.
(quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55,
63, 22 S.Ct 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902)).
Courts have recognized exceptions to alleviate the harsh effects of statutes of limitations, but the exceptions involve cases
where "plaintiff[s] had no way of knowing
the injury had occurred until after the statute had run and therefore no way of affixing or exploring potential liability within
the statutory period." McHenry, 724
F.Supp. at 839.
In the context of civil tort claims, "[a]
cause of action for personal injury generally accrues when the accident occurs."
Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196,
1199 (Utah 1987) (Howe, J., concurring);
see also, Gardner v. Industrial Comm'n,
517 P.2d 1329, 1330 (Utah 1973) (applicant
did not file compensation claim within either three years from date of accident or
date of last compensation, therefore claim
was wholly barred under section 35-1-99).
Additionally, "mere ignorance of the exis-
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tence of a cause of action does not prevent
the running of the statute of limitations."
Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.
[5] Petitioner knew of his injury on
July 4, 1968. He received medical treatment for his injury and was aware of recurring back pain over a period of several
years. Therefore, even though petitioner
did not seek a disability rating or file a
compensation claim until twenty-two years
after his accident, he knew of the injury
and could have filed for compensation within the statutory period. Petitioner seeks a
rule which would postpone running of the
statute until he "discovered" the full extent of his injury. The workers' compensation statute, however, does not require stabilization before filing for benefits. Petitioner's argument that he had no alternative remedy because the Workers' Compensation Act is his exclusive remedy, also
fails because under either the Act or a civil
tort action, he would be subject to a statute
of limitations. His alternative remedy was
to timely file.
We conclude that the statute of limitations found in Utah Code Annotated section
35-1*99 does not, on its face, manifest a
denial of justice that would require us to
overcome the statute's presumption of constitutionality. It provides a reasonable
time to file a claim, dating from the date of
injury. See McHenry, 724 F.Supp. at 837
(upholding the constitutionality of Utah's
four-year statute of limitations for civil actions). We further conclude that the statute as applied to petitioner does not violate
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution because he knew of his injury
within the limitations period.
Equal Protection
[6] Petitioner also asks this court to
invalidate section 35-1-99 on equal protection grounds. He argues that restricting
injured workers from bringing claims for
permanent, partial disability after the statute of limitations has run, unlawfully discriminates against those who have not been
rated within that time frame. This argument is not persuasive.

The equal protection provision of article
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
states: "All laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation." The supreme
court's most recent formulation of the
equal protection test is as follows: " '[The]
test to be applied under article I, section 24
is whether the classification of those subject to the legislation is a reasonable one
and bears a reasonable relationship to an
achievement of the legitimate legislative
purpose.'" Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (quoting Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah
1988)).
The statute of limitations in section 351-99 classifies injured workers in a reasonable manner in that all injured workers are
subject to the same limitations period within which to file a claim for compensation.
An injured worker's disability rating is a
component that is separate and distinct
from the actual compensation claim, and
the worker's responsibility is to timely file
within the statutory period with or without
a disability rating in hand. We also conclude that limiting the compensation claim
period for workers bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate
legislative purpose. Limiting compensation claims to a three-year period from the
date of the accident protects employers and
the State of Utah Second Injury Fund from
having to defend stale claims—a legitimate
legislative purpose.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the statute of limitations in Utah Code Annotated section 35-199 (1974) does not violate the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution, and additionally conclude that there is no equal
protection violation inherent in its application. The Industrial Commission's ruling is
affirmed.
RUSSON and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT,
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

WORKERS7 COMPENSATION ACT
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTSInjured Worker and/or
Dependant Heirs

Employer
Exclusive remedy
§35-1-60 U.C.A.
Action can only be
brought in administrative
proceedings.

1.

A sure, predictable,
though limited remedy -because of mandatory
insurance coverage.

2.

No fault system - - n o
reduction or elimination
of benefits by comparable
fault.

3.

Comparatively speedy and
inexpensive
administrative process.

Speedy resolution.
No lengthy jury trial
with its uncertainties.
Less costly.
Limited, predictable
fixed damages.
a.

No pain and
suffering damages.

4.

b.

No projected future
special damages.
Damages decided and
paid as they accrue.

Preservation of right to
pursue third parties for
full damages -- §35-1-62,
U.C.A.

5.

Employer and employee on
same side in third party
cases.

6.

All employees treated
alike.

7.

Continuing jurisdiction
of the Industrial
Commission to modify
awards based on changes
in injured employee's
condition. §35-1-78
U.C.A.

Broad based risk
spreading on industry
through mandatory
insurance or qualifying
through bonding with
Industrial Commission to
be a self-insured
employer.
Right to be reimbursed
from third party
recoveries §35-1-62 .
a.

Is "trustee" of the
cause of action for
injured worker or
dependant heirs in
death case.

All employers treated
alike.
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